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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
In the contemporary business organization, individual activities are 
pooled together in order that it may effectively adapt to uncertainties inhe-
rent in a highly complex environment. But what is the nature and scope of 
the optimum activity performed in the «business edifice»? This work tra-
ces the notion of optimum activity in organizational system theory with the 
aim of comparing and evaluating such notion under the light of the Aristo-
telian account of practical activity. System perspective in organizations is 
a trend which has imported ideas from various fields of study. The system 
model of productive activity typifies the contemporary aspiration of a ho-
listic account of an activity which can handle future contingencies. It pos-
tulates that production is a rational activity which considers the informa-
tion coming from an uncertain environment. 
The present endeavor is not a critical survey of the plethora of con-
cepts proper to organizational theory. Rather, it is an examination of the 
conceptual assumptions of individual activity on the basis of which the or-
ganization as a system is constructed. It can be gleaned that the author pos-
tulates that behind the study of the business firm (conceived as an organi-
zed set of activities) is the notion of human activity which Aristotle has 
talked about in the Metaphysics and, especially, in his Nicomachean Et-
hics. It can likewise be seen that underneath this work lies the question: 
Can organizational system theory import ideas from Aristotle's Theory of 
Action? Stated in other words, what can the Stagyrite say on the quest for 
the optimum activity in the business enterprise? 
Divided into two sections, the first chapter discusses the incipient 
notions of productive activity. A pair of concepts are examined in this 
chapter: «work by knowledge» and work environment. They are described 
as the basic presuppositions of work activity in the corporate enterprise. 
Given the dearth of authorities in the analysis of the corporate enterprise, 
the inquiry will focus its attention on the precursors of these ideas which 
have greatly influenced the perspective of business organizations. Concre-
tely, the first section is dedicated to the explanation of the notion of «work 
by knowledge* introduced by Frederick Taylor, the founder of Scientific 
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Management. However, it was solely applied to the factory floor. Henri 
Fayol amplified the Tayloristic concept of work activity throughout the 
business firm. His theory later became known as «Classical Administrative 
Theory». The contributions of Taylor and Fayol undoubtedly have left an 
indelible imprint in the study of business organizations. 
The second section of the chapter is the reaction provoked by the 
so-called convent ional theory». It is grounded on the affirmation that 
work environment greatly influences individual activities. This trend is de-
nominated as the Human Relations Movement which is heavily bent on the 
psycho-sociological perspective. On the basis of the conclusion reached by 
Elton Mayo and his Hawthorne Group, Chester Barnard attempted to form 
a comprehensive and unitary organizational theory similar to what Fayol 
had done with the findings of Taylor. A further enhancement of the move-
ment's conception of work activity was conveyed by Douglas McGregor. 
Anchoring on Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, McGregor formu-
lated Theory X and Theory Y; theories which also influenced a great deal 
the Neo-Human Relations School 1. 
Chapter 2 contains the system model of productive activity. Embra-
cing the preceding notions on work activity, this paradigm embodies the 
contemporary aspiration of a holistic account of activity in an environment 
wrought by future uncertainties. It affirms that production is entirely a ra-
tional activity which is greatly influenced by environmental energy or in-
formation. By drawing the essential notions of General System Theory and 
Cybernetics, the system perspective provides a deeper insight on the dyna-
mism of production process performed in a contingent situation. For this 
reason, it behooves a greater understanding of system thinking to expound 
on the system concepts from which the paradigm is derived. These are sta-
ted in the first section of the chapter. The following section touches on the 
concrete aspects of the organizational system model of productive activity. 
The chapter concludes with a brief account of the firm's dynamic rela-
tionship vis-á-vis complex environment. In spite of its consideration of the 
uncertain environment, the search for the optimum handling of future con-
tingencies continues as manifested by the actual state of organizational 
system theory 2. 
Indeed, the system model is superior to the preceding notions of 
productive activity. Furthermore, it is analogous to the Aristotelian con-
cept of poiesis. With the concepts previously discussed as parameters, 
chapter 3 begins with a comparison between the system model and the 
Stagyrite's own account of poietic activity. The first section talks about the 
principle of making, namely: thinking or operation. Considered in itself, 
thinking is an activity which is nobler than whatever form of activity. It is 
the foundation of the person's adaptation to the environment because thin-
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king is the activity which captures the information regarding the state of 
the external world. The next section dwells into the second constitutive 
element of the activity, production process. It is the aspect of poietic acti-
vity which manifests how thinking influences the external world in time. 
The articulation between these two constitutive elements is outlined in this 
section. The next section is the Aristotelian evaluation of production. Its 
discussion does not depart from the comparison with the system model 
since the evaluation is developed from the following question, to wit: is 
production a negentropic activity? 
The fourth chapter is an examination of another activity which is 
done in the contingent level, namely: action or praxis. Action is a practical 
activity just like production. As such, the former is similar in some res-
pects to the latter. That is to say, both are carried out in the environment 
over a period of time. Action may seem to be an alternative to production, 
if it could be shown that production is not a negentropic activity, and that 
praxis enjoys a certain advantage over poiesis. The fact that both are prac-
tical activities makes this evaluation possible. The succeeding inquiry is 
whether or not action has a certain privilege of superiority over production. 
It follows the same pattern of argumentation as the evaluation in the prece-
ding chapter. The last section of the chapter is the structure of the action 
paradigm which puts into evidence what the second section has accomplis-
hed. 
This study ends with what contemporary system analysis of the bu-
siness enterprise has obtained in its search for the optimum activity. The 
conclusion likewise assesses what Aristotle can say about this aspiration. 
As such, it comments on whether or not Aristotle's Theory of Action is re-
levant for providing the cornerstone on which the business edifice can so-
lidly rest. 
The author wishes to express some words of caution. It would be 
presumptuous to say that the outcome of this study is the panacea to the 
present crisis of the analysis of business enterprises. As mentioned above, 
what shall be attempted here is an inquiry of the basic unit of the collabo-
rative effort which exists in the firm. Individual activity is the conditio sine 
qua non of corporate actions. It is the foundation on which the corporate 
edifice is constructed. Thus, organizing individual activities in the firm 
(that is, the laying of the building blocks of the edifice) is not within the 
purview of this work. 
The author is greatly indebted to Messrs. Oscar Olmos, Francis 
Ongkingco and Roderrick Esclanda for their valuable help in proof-rea-
ding the text. Their corrections have contributed towards the realization of 
the actual form of this work. 
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NOTES OF THE INTRODUCTION 
1. Cf. GRINT, K., The Sociology of Work, Polity Press, Oxford 1 9 9 1 , pp. 
1 2 7 - 1 3 1 . 
2. Cf. SCOTT, W.R., «The Sociology of Organizations: Crisis or Conti-
nuum?^ in HlMMELSTRAND, U. (ed.), Sociology: The Aftermath of Crisis, 
Sage Publications, California 1986 quoted in SCOTT, W.R., Organiza-
tions: Rational, Natural and Open Systems, Prentice Hall, New Jersey 
1987 , p. X V : «The dominant cathedral of Rational Structure has been 
partially dismantled and, although portions are still standing, many of its 
building blocks have been carted off to be reconfigured into alternative 
and challenging constructions. More fragile shelters and colorful but per-
haps temporary tents have been thrust up in vacant lots. The scene is one 
of much animation and energy: raw materials and scaffolding are strewn 
about; lamps in windows and camp fires burn far into the night. The ima-
ge I wish to convey of the present situation ... is partly that of crisis and 
confusion but more that of vigorous controversy and an enriching profu-
sion of competing models and methods». Cf. WILLMOTT, H., «Beyond pa-
radigmatic closure in organizational enquiry», in HASSARD, J. and PYM, 
D. (eds.), The Theory and Philosophy of Organizations: Critical Issues 
and New Perspectives, Routledge, New York 1980, pp. 44 -60 . 
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FACING FUTURE CONTINGENCIES 
Aristotle's Optimum Activity as a Proposal 
for Organizational Systems 
THE INCIPIENT NOTIONS OF WORK ACTIVITY 
A. TOWARDS WORK BY KNOWLEDGE 
In the nineteenth century, the worker acquired his skills by tradition 
or by experience. Such has been the case for many centuries until Frede-
rick W. Taylor introduced his principles of Scientific Management which 
revolutionized the shop floor. Scientific Management was responsible for 
the increased production in the factory and consequently, the increase of 
wages that freed the workman from the level of bare subsistence. Nevert-
heless, what is germane to the aim of this study is Taylor's contribution to 
the notion of work activity. Instead of basing the activity on tradition or 
experience, it is based on knowledge. 
Taylor postulated that the objective of management was to ensure 
maximum prosperity. This objective has a two-fold meaning within the 
context of the firm. On the one hand, maximum prosperity for the emplo-
yer because he or she receives a larger profit, and that the development of 
every department of the firm reaches a superior degree of excellence. On 
the other, maximum prosperity for the employee because he or she not 
only receives relatively higher salaries but also acquires an increase of effi-
ciency within the best of his or her abilities'. 
The concern of the enterprise, therefore, is a higher bottom-line so 
as to provide an increase in the wealth of the employer and an increase in 
the wages of the workmen. The popular interpretations of Taylor's primary 
motive (for example that his primordial motive was to increase the profits 
of the capitalists disregarding the miserable subsistence-level wages of the 
factory workers) in formulating his system are false. Taylor was not prima-
rily occupied with efficiency or economy nor was he concerned solely 
with the profit-making motive of the employer. Drucker pointed out that 
these false interpretations of Taylor's primary aim were a result of not ha-
ving considered Taylor's view on management's objective 2. 
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The most important contribution of Taylor 's Scientific Manage-
ment is the introduction of knowledge in manual activities 3. Scientific Ma-
nagement attempts to foster efficient work activities in the factory floor. Its 
foundation rests on a set of clearly defined laws, rules and formulae. The 
main principles of scientific management are the following: 1) The collec-
tion of traditional work methods so as to develop a science (composed of 
rules, laws and formulae) of a specific activity; 2) A scientific selection 
and training of factory hand; 3) Cooperation in accordance with the esta-
blished principles of a concrete activity; 4) An equal division of work and 
responsibility4. 
The cooperation which scientific management envisions is «not the 
type of cooperation in which a mass of workmen on one side together coo-
perate with the managment; but that in which several men in the manage-
ment (each one in his own particular way) help each workman indivi-
dually, on the one hand, by studying his need and his shortcomings and 
teaching him better and quicker methods, and, on the other hand, by seeing 
that all other workmen with whom he comes in contact help and cooperate 
with him by doing their part of the work right and fast» 5. From the view-
point of the Taylorist doctrine, cooperation in the factory floor is achieved 
when «managers assume new burdens, new duties, and responsibilities* 6 
on which this system rests for its foundations. 
The notion of cooperation espoused by Taylor solely refers to one 
part of the business enterprise, namely: the factory floor. Henri Fayol 
adapts Taylor's notion as a point of departure but goes even further by 
applying it to how an entire firm is organized. Scientific Management was 
restricted within the shop floor. Its primary interest was to improve the 
performance of the factory hand. This contribution was later adapted by 
Henri Fayol, the father of administrative theory. His elucidation of the ad-
ministrative process contributed to the amplification of Taylor's concept of 
work activity in all levels of the organization 7. 
Fayol defines management as «the drawing up of the broad plan of 
how the business will operate, assembling the personnel, or coordinating 
and harmonizing all of the organization's efforts and activities* 8. The ma-
nagerial function is principally exercised through the personnel unlike ot-
her functions such as accounting, and security are primarily concerned 
with money, material and machines. The managerial function, therefore, is 
a corporate-wide activity which cuts through the entire personnel structure 
of the firm. It aims to achieve the optimum level of available resources and 
coherence among the sub-activities which managers perform. 
It can be gathered, from what has been said above, that the plan pre-
supposes the idea that every activity is manager-based. It shows how Fayol 
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has the same line of thought as Taylor in attributing to the manager the 
stock knowledge required to run the firm. Since the top echelon of the bu-
siness claims for itself the monopoly of this stock, then it follows that it 
has the power to plan or to systematize personnel actions in pursuit of 
company objectives. Moreover, since these plans are claimed by manage-
ment to be accurate, then it means that the personnel must diligently 
comply them. Thus, it is not surprising that the human person in the enter-
prise, the employee, is a factor which must be manipulated together with 
the rest. The employee is like any other passive company resource subjec-
ted to management manipulation. In the words of Simon and March, the 
personnel is considered as a «given» 9. 
The «Classical Administrative Theory» is an amplification of Tay-
lor's doctrine. Both believe the division of work into simpler tasks. What is 
important, however, is the application of the «rational logic» of Scientific 
Management to all facets of the business organization. It maintains that the 
firm must be divided into the basic activities such as production, maintenan-
ce, etc. These activities are necessary for the attainment of the firm's goals. 
The division of the organizational activity into basic activities 
avoids their overlapping and costs in organizational activity are minimi-
zed. This system guarantees «uniformity in the performance of every task, 
regardless of the number of persons engaged in it, and the coordination of 
different tasks» 1 0 . It defines the responsibility of each corporate member 
and his relationships with the rest. 
The organization of the work activities requires their division into 
several elementary motions. Drucker lucidly declares that this affirmation 
led to the further misinterpretation of equating improvement of individual 
operations with confinement of the worker to a specific task element of the 
entire work activity". This results to strict dichotomy between planning 
and performing the work activity. According to the Taylorist doctrine, 
planning the work rests on management while performing it belongs to the 
workers. This schism between planning and doing was a typical trend of 
his time which was basically Puritan inspired 1 2. The prerogative of mana-
gement to decide for the worker underlies the notion that only manage-
ment has the competence in technical affairs 1 3. What can be observed here 
is the problem that confronts the bureaucratic system of organization and 
in particular the classical organizational theory: the problem of change. 
The rational logic of a bureaucraticized form of organization is that change 
has to come from the top and must be universal and must therefore affect 
the entire organizational bloc' 4 . 
The idea of work by knowledge drastically changed the notion of 
work activity. It heavily emphasizes, however, on planning and directing 
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activities without considering the individual worker 's perception with re-
gard to his work environment 1 5 . According to this scheme, the worker is 
restricted to his behavioral alternatives 1 6. This observation provoked a ne-
gative reaction and contributed to a sharp refocusing of work activity 
which the Human Relations Movement undertook. 
B. THE WORK ENVIRONMENT 
The so-called Human Relations Movement, rather than focusing on 
the rationalization of the work activity, focuses on the behavior of the indi-
vidual worker. The Hawthorne Group of Elton Mayo started this move-
ment by affirming the influence of the work environment upon the indivi-
dual worker. Chester Barnard developed an organizational theory based on 
the findings of the Hawthorne Experiment. His observation of the notion 
of cooperation within the work environment resulted to the notion of the 
organization as a system composed of activities consciously performed by 
the agents of such system. Barnard values the process of communication to 
maintain the organization as a system of cooperative effort among the indi-
viduals comprising the organization. 
Barnard calls human activity and its factual aspects as behavior. He 
postulates that behavior is a result of psychological factors. These factors 
are defined as «the combination, resultants, or residues of the physical, bio-
logical, and social factors which have determined the history and the pre-
sent state of the individual in relation to his present environment^ 7 . This af-
firmation agrees with Elton Mayo's observation that the individual's 
perception of his environment has a direct influence on his work behavior 1 8. 
Barnard's explanation of organizations is based on his own notion 
of cooperation as an inherent aspect in any social grouping. An individual 
by himself cannot accomplish his purposes alone. He needs the collusion 
of other people to meet his ends. Thus, he joins a group because some of 
the interests of the group are compatible with some of his own. An organi-
zation is composed of persons. However, an organization cannot pursue its 
goals without its members' willingness to serve 1 9 . 
When a person cooperates with other individuals, he or she is ex-
pected to assimilate the purpose of the entire group. Any form of coopera-
tion imbued with a purpose is the principal channel through which the inte-
llectual capacities of individuals pass and originate. This common purpose 
is achieved by coordinating the efforts of the individual members of the or-
ganization. Purpose is an element without which cooperation would be en-
tirely meaningless and whose communication is an essential executive 
function2 0. 
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The communication of purpose is the process that puts into motion 
the possibility of pursuing a common end and the capacity of individuals 
to cooperate. An organization arises when there are people who can com-
municate with each other. People in a cooperative system must be willing 
to contribute action which tends to the attainment of the common goal. 
Thus, for Barnard, purpose, communication and the willingness to serve 
are the elements which give rise to an organization 2 '. 
Barnard's notion of cooperative effort in the business enterprise ta-
kes into account the individual's perception of the environment. He postu-
lates that it is a very important ingredient in the effectiveness as well as in 
the efficiency of the organization. For this reason, the organization cannot 
solely rely on the work activity but also depends on the working environ-
ment. This requires a process of communication in all levels of the firm. In 
the final analysis, the organization is characterized as an interdependent 
coalition of individuals pursuing a common end. Douglas McGregor calls 
this cooperative effort as interdependence whereby the individual learns by 
means of participation in solving the problems faced by the firm. 
Douglas McGregor's «Theory Y» depends on cooperation in the 
work environment. This Theory Y adopts the prism of Maslow's hierarchy 
of needs as opposed to the assumptions maintained by the conventional 
theory which McGregor denominates as «Theory X». Traditional theory 
disregards the behavioral component in the work environment. In contrast, 
Theory Y postulates a working climate which enables the participant to di-
rect and succeed in his or her activity. From the organizational perspective, 
the capability of the participants to direct their own activities is a conditio 
sine qua non for the pursuit of the common objective. The work environ-
ment is not governed by dependent relationships but rather by interdepen-
dence among individuals comprising the entire firm. The productive acti-
vity therefore becomes a learning process which the individual personally 
undertakes 2 2. 
Interdependence requires striking a balance between the applica-
tion of some specific types of dependence which do not frustrate indivi-
dual 's aspirations; giving him independence which does not permit a si-
tuation of anxiety to arise in him. The corporate organization can neither 
ignore what it wants to pursue nor tie the hands of its members. McGre-
gor coincides with Barnard's position that cooperation is geared towards 
the needs of the individual. As he lucidly declares, «management cannot 
provide a man with self-respect or with the respect of his fellows, or with 
the satisfaction of needs for self-fulfillment....(It) can create conditions 
such that he is encouraged and enabled to seek such satisfactions for him-
self...» 2 3 
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Having emphasized on the work environment, the humanist trend 
overlooked the cognitive dimension as the principle of work activity. Furt-
hermore, such emphasis insufficiently recognizes the impact on both the 
firm and the individual of future contingencies in the external environ-
ment. System thinking in organization addresses these questions with the 
aim of providing a holistic account of productive activity in a highly inde-
terminate world. 
THE SYSTEM MODEL OF PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY 
A. THE OPEN SYSTEM AND ITS INFORMATION PROCESSING CAPABILITY 
The ideas expounded by early organizational theories are presuppo-
sed by organizational system thinking. System thinking in organizations is 
considered as an attempt to explain in a holistic manner the work activity 
which happens in the enterprise. The paradigm of productive activity 
which this theory offers is taken from the conceptual notions of General 
System Theory introduced by Ludwig von Bertalanffy and Cybernetics by 
Norbert Wiener. 
General System Theory (GST) criticizes the Newtonian world view 
as a conventional scientific thinking which fails to explain the interaction 
of various elements or processes 2 4. GST proposes a dynamic interrelated-
ness of the things within the world, whereas conventional ways of thinking 
are considered as closed views of the world. It represents a departure from 
the conventional modes of viewing man and the enterprise. While the 
Newtonian world view is deterministic, system theory adopts a contingent 
view of the world 2 5. 
Teleological or purposeful behavior is due to feedback mechanisms 
of the system 2 6 . Cybernetics, considered as a branch of General System 
Theory by von Bertalanffy, is the discipline which studies how a system 
receives and responds to information coming from its surroundings. It in-
vestigates the communication and control of the cybernetic machine. As-
suming the contingency view of the world, it considers man as an informa-
tion-processing system 2 7. 
A dynamic system enjoys an equilibrium state described as the sys-
tem's internal stable disposition on which its activity is based 2 8 . Since the 
system is in continuous dialogue with its environment, it receives informa-
tion coming from the external environment which serves as systemic re-
sources for the performance of work. 
Any type of dynamic system is in equilibrium state with its envi-
ronment. The equilirium state is the system's internal constitution which 
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offers a range of possible systemic activities in the external environment. 
This constitution, expressed in mathematical form, is called the set of 
constraint. The constraint set reflects in mathemetical form the possible 
states of the world. It is, so to speak, the theory regarding the environ-
ment 2 9. The constraint is a formula of the system field defined as «the pha-
se-space containing all the lines of behavior found by releasing the system 
from all possible initial states in a particular set of surrounding condi-
tions» 3 0. 
According to the mathematical theory of information, the constraint 
not only channels energy flow but also senses the energy density of the en-
vironment and uses that information to direct the modification of the envi-
ronment. Sensing energy density serves to detect whether a specific part of 
the environment is conducive for energy exhanges. The constraint set is, 
therefore, the system's potentiality from which the behavior with the envi-
ronment is based 3 1. 
The processing of information is based on the structural configura-
tion of the system which is known as the constraint. It reflects the possible 
states of the environment. It likewise is responsible for sensing and discer-
ning the relevant information which triggers a systemic response. The 
constraint or the equilibrium state is the system's potentiality which per-
mits the system to perform an activity in a contingent environment. In the 
context of the organization, such potentiality is the cognitive dimension of 
productive activity. 
B . THE FIRM'S COGNITIVE DIMENSION 
Organizational system thinking assumes and improves upon the in-
cipient notions of work activity. It assumes that the principle of work acti-
vity is rationality which is considered as internal consistency of choice and 
maximization of self-interest3 2. 
The concept of rationality is borrowed from the physical sciences, 
or more exactly, from statistical mechanics. Maximization of one's satis-
faction or putting it negatively, the minimization of dissatisfaction, has its 
origin in the least-action principle of mechanics 3 3 . This principle serves as 
the basis for the maximum-minimum continuum of statistical mechanics 
and of its predecessor, classical mechanics. «The discovery of external 
principles (the maximum-minimum continuum) is of vital importance for 
physics and economics since it permits determination of one particular 
path of motion or action out of the many possible paths, i.e. the path of the 
maximum or minimum, as the one taken by nature in physics or as the one 
to be taken by human action in économies» 3 4 . 
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Simon's «bounded rationality* is a perspective of the rationality of 
an individual decision-maker immersed in an uncertain environment. It is a 
widely accepted assumption in organizational model-building 3 5 . Contrary 
to what early decision theories assume, bounded rationality presupposes 
that an agent perceives only a part of the environment. 
Decisions regarding the allocation of personnel and resources for 
production purposes in contemporary organizations is more complex than 
the assumptions of classical economic theory and statistical decision the-
ory. Administrative practice, drawing to a large extent from these theories, 
assumes that the decision maker possesses objective rationality in deciding 
a determinate course of action. Objective rationality means that the beha-
vior of an individual is an integrated pattern which results from a panora-
mic vision of the alternatives available for decision-making, the foresight 
of all the consequences of these alternatives, and the selection of the opti-
mum of the alternatives with a system of values serving as its criterion. 
This view of objective rationality applied in organizations implies that «it 
is not necessary to expend resources specifically to achieve coordination; 
no administrative overhead is required for planning, collective decision 
making, or control* 3 6. 
The validity of theories based upon objective rationality depends on 
the simplicity of the confronted situation. In other words, objective ratio-
nality is a type of rationality that confronts only a tiny fraction of the real 
environment in which the decision maker moves. Specific events characte-
rized by certainty occur in this fraction of the real environment. 
However, the individual acting on real circumstances does not, ho-
wever, reflect the assumptions of the rational man of classical economic 
and statistical decision theories. The first reason is that these models are 
valid only for situations of certainty; it is clear that environmental situa-
tions are not always certain. The second is that in real life, the individual 
cannot foresee all the consequences which will follow from his behavior. 
In sum, the environment in which the individual finds himself is far too 
complex to be handled alone: an individual's behavior is purposive but it is 
limited. The decisions taken according to bounded rationality will be valid 
only if the utility functions and assumed scenarios match those of the real 
world 3 7. 
The individual possesses limited calculative powers. Simon calls 
this rational limitation as bounded rationality. Bounded rationality has the 
following characteristics: a) decisions relate to concrete (instead of com-
prehensive) issues which are more or less independent of the others; b) fu-
ture scenarios are general (not exact and detailed) visions of perceived 
consequences of one's actions; c) decisions pertain to specific features of 
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the individual's life, and reflect concrete values of the individual; d) facts 
are evaluated and preferences are evoked on the basis of those facts 3 8. 
The individual is unable to picture the entire complex environment 
in which he encounters himself, but captures only a part of it. Due to the 
decision maker's limited frame of reference, selective information is exer-
cised in the process. An important assumption of organizational system 
thinking regarding rationality is that it is influenced by the individual's 
perception of the environment 3 9. Rational choice in each individual is the-
refore considered as a limited calculative process whose end (that is, the 
chosen course of action) is an action towards the resolution of a perceived 
problematic situation 4 0. In this context, rationality in behavior connotes the 
grasping of relations which are necessary for the individual's adaptibility 
to the environmental situation. The person's adaptive behavior to the envi-
ronment is achieved by capturing objects (found in the environment) into 
behavioral patterns (gestalts) which are the set of actions capable of active 
repetition. Thus, two poles exist in the decision making process. They may 
be generally called as adaptation and assimilation. The individual's deci-
sion making system (or cognitive system) is isomorphic with the open sys-
tem model 4 1. 
The system perspective in organization postulates that the basis of 
work activity is the agent's cognitive dimension. This is the potentiality 
from which activity springs. The agent 's rationality is, however, limited. 
The nature of the agent's rationality demands that the environmental cli-
mate within the organization is conducive to the pursuit of the common 
objective and that the individual assumes the norms and criteria establis-
hed by the enterprise 4 2. For this reason, productive activity is constructed 
by pooling individual activities together into the form of a means-ends 
chain 4 3. 
Rules and procedures established along the means-ends chain are 
production techniques which enable the effective and efficient generation 
of the output 4 4 . Activities performed according to the existing rules and 
procedures of the organization denotes that each of the agents and the enti-
re enterprise are concomitantly at an equilibrium state 4 5. 
An organization, through the discernment and use of information or 
energy coming from the contingent environment, generates an output. The 
administrative apparatus is the systemic part which selects the firm's envi-
ronment and organizes the activities towards the generation of the firm's 
output 4 6. The manager perceives information which is disseminated within 
the organization in order to achieve a fit with the environment, that is, in 
order to meet the output demanded by the environment. Determined'infor-
mation is communicated, thereby provoking the performance of activities 
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which are carried out sequentially along the means-ends chain of the enter-
prise. Behavior is «adaptive at any one time.... This "one-thing-at-a-time" 
or "ceteris paribus" approach to adaptive behavior is fundamental to the 
very existence of something we can call organizational structure* 4 7. 
The aim of communication is «to influence the conduct of the recei-
ver* 4 8 (that is, the subordinate) with the view of obtaining the result plan-
ned by the transmitter (that is, the manager). The influencing of individual 
behavior rests on the assumption that the person always seeks his own in-
terest. According to system thinking, the process of learning takes the form 
of an adaptive response which triggers a reordering of behavioral patterns 
which fit the demands of the decision environment. Learning or cognitive 
success signifies that the cognitive system assimilates the relevant factors 
which link the system with environment. Learning occurs when there is a 
continuous and progressive systemic adaptation to the environment in the 
form of feedback cycles. 
Learned behavior is synonymous to success in adapting to the envi-
ronment. This learned behavior remains imbedded within the organization 
in the form of records and manuals, and if, done successfully, they become 
routine procedures. This is similar to Aristole's description of acquiring 
the potentiality of producing by performing the very activity of produc-
tion 4 9. 
C . THE LIMITS OF THE SYSTEM PARADIGM OF PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY 
Organizational system thinking emphasizes that the enterprise rela-
tes itself with an uncertain environment. System thinking in organizations 
portrays the corporate enterprise as an «organized complexity circumscri-
bed by the existence of strong interactions* 5 0. It tries to explain the dy-
namism of a complex whole with different parts pertaining to it. Systemic 
explanations of organizations are given by the relat ionship between orga-
nizational behavior and the biological and physiological capacities and ne-
eds of the actors, and ... the respective adaptations between the organiza-
tion and its geographical-physical environment* 5 1. Organizational system 
thinking sees the organization «as an open system in which the behaviors 
of members are themselves interrelated* 5 2. Moreover, the open system mo-
del attempts to explain «the ways in which any given system meets its ne-
eds through other systems (its "input") and the services which it then goes 
on to provide for them (its "output")* 5 3 . 
The interdependency among the parts of an organization has a cer-
tain order which reflects the equilibrium state of the system 5 4. The organi-
zation, however, intends to maintain its equilibrium in the face of a more 
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complex and changing environment by controlling the information which 
it receives from the environment 5 5 . The system, with which the envi-
ronment interacts, responds to the demands imposed by this environment 
through its structural form 5 6. 
As organizations deal with their respective environments, unit seg-
mentation takes place within them. Each unit or subsystem has the func-
tion of coping with the problems presented by a corresponding environ-
mental segment 5 7. Its function is to adapt to the specific demands imposed 
by that specific segment. In order that the system may respond to environ-
mental demands, coordination between the subunits of the entire system is 
essential. Unit segmentation is a condition which makes it possible for the 
system to survive in the face of environmental complexity. The system's 
persistence to remain dynamic is the reduction of environmental comple-
xity through systemic differentiation 5 8. Sub-units arising from differentia-
tion «help an organization achieve a better fit with its environment, allo-
wing it to compete more effectively with other organizational forms for 
vital resources* 5 9. 
However, a problem arises when coping with environmental com-
plexity: 
the principal problem created by diversification is that it 
creates increasing complexity and uncertainty —this time within 
the organization rather than in the environment— up to a level that 
exceeds the information-processing and decision-making capacity 
of the managers60. 
Although organizational system thinking assumes that the indivi-
dual adapts to the contingent environment, its paradigm for productive ac-
tivity seems to be incapable of confronting uncertainty. Earlier it has been 
mentioned that the systemic model is analogous to the Aristotelian account 
of production (poiesis). By comparing the systemic model with the Aristo-
telian account of productive activity, the following chapter shall evaluate 
whether or not this activity is the optimum for confronting uncertainty. 
ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY 
A. OPERATION: THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION IN THE PRODUCTION MODEL 
According to system theory, when a system is isolated from contin-
gent situations, the information contained within that system is what Ch-
ristenson calls as the theory of the system. This theory is composed of the 
systemic assumptions regarding the external environment; it is the infor-
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mation which the system possesses about the environment in which it mo-
ves. Theory is, according to system theory of the business enterprise, the 
basis of adaptation to the environment. He asserts that «the symbolic ex-
pression of the organizational form of a given system is simply a theory of 
that system. The organizational form must serve the function of coordina-
ting the possible states of the system in the face of its interactions with its 
environment* 6 1. 
Theory therefore provides the basis for interacting with the environ-
ment. When interacting with its environment, the system uses this stored 
information in conjunction with the input which it receives from the envi-
ronment. When applied in contingent situations, the set of variables com-
prising theory constitutes the equilibrium state of the system. It is the sys-
tem's stable internal disposition for performing an activity within a given 
situation. This stable internal disposition dictates how the system passes 
from its initial to final state. In the context of an economic organization, 
this stable internal disposition forms the so-called set of norms and proce-
dures of production which permits the production process to achieve its re-
sult under certain contingent situations and which forms the cognitive di-
mension of systemic activity. 
How does Aristotle consider theory? More concretely, what preci-
sely is the nature and scope of thought? Aristotle affirms that «everything 
is a possible object of thought» 6 2 . Thus, the intellect has the possibility of 
knowing all things. For this reason, Aristotle says that the «soul is in a way 
all things» 6 3. 
It is in this affirmation that Aristotle explains how adaptation to the 
environment is achieved 6 4. Thought is perfectly adaptable to all things. For 
this reason, operation «is essentially "adaptation". All other forms of adap-
tation are only analogies of the adaptation in which operation consists* 
(Bastons) 6 5. The person not only has the possibility of knowing things, but 
is also capable of perceiving the principles and laws governing these things. 
Reason captures the essences of the things. These are the principles 
which are considered as the absolute laws of the real. In so far as it captu-
res those laws, science can be claimed as true 6 6 . The Stagyrite explains on 
how these «environmental laws» are acquired: 
Thus the states neither belong in us in a determinate form, 
nor come about from other states that are more cognitive, but they 
come about from perception - as in a battle when a rout occurs, if 
one makes a stand another does and then another, until a position of 
strength is reached. And the soul is such as to be capable of under-
going this67. 
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The object of thought which an operation captures is the informa-
tion stored» by the act. What differentiates one thing from another is mat-
ter. If operation is devoid of all matter, then the captured object is identical 
to the operation: 
... thought is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as its 
objects are. For in the case of objects which involve no matter, 
what thinks and what is thought are identical68. 
While one is thinking, the object of thought is already present: the 
activity of thinking has already thought the object and has already appro-
priated the object as something that is its own. Operation possesses the ob-
ject in the very act itself: 
What is immanent of operation is possession. To know in 
act, if the act is an operation, is to possess the known (object).... 
The operation of knowing does not gradually proceed towards a re-
sult but rather (knowing) has already achieved it69. 
The possession of an intellectual operation is eminently peculiar 
and is called immanent appropriation or possession. Possession of the ob-
ject is immanent when the known object is simultaneously present in the 
activity of thinking™. The operation's possession of the object is imma-
nent. There is a co-presence between the operation and its object due to the 
fact that what is captured is likewise immaterial. Thus, the so-called imma-
nent possession of the object on the part of operation is analogous to the 
storage of information. The intellectual operation permits the capture of 
the environment which forms the object of thought. Within information 
theory, this object of thought can be abstractly construed as the quantity of 
information stored in the hardware. 
The individual can act in and upon the environment on the basis of 
the knowledge that he has of it. The knowledge proper to production is ca-
lled technical knowledge and pertains to the theoretical ambit of producti-
ve activity. The existence of this knowledge is affirmed by Aristotle: 
«Every science seeks certain principles and causes for each of its objects -
e.g. medicine and gymnastics and each of the other sciences, whether pro-
ductive or mathemat ica l 7 1 . 
Knowledge is a potentiality of contraries since it involves a con-
cept or formula (logos) which manifests both the thing in so far as it is 
and its privation accidentally. For this reason, «the things whose potentia-
lity is according to a rational formula act contrariwise to things whose po-
tentiality is non-rational, for the products of the former are included under 
one principle, the rational formula» 7 2 . In technical knowledge, this con-
4 0 RAÚL M. ASUNCIÓN 
cept or object is the form-principle. It is the form of the object detached 
from matter: 
the knowledge is the the object. In the productive sciences 
(if we abstract from the matter) the substance in the essence, and in 
the theoretical sciences the formula or the act of thinking, is the ob-
ject. As, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in 
the case of things that have not matter, they will be the same, i.e. 
the thinking will be the one with the object of its thought73. 
This «general and abstract study of the form of producing* is com-
posed of a system of general principles in view of generating the product 7 4. 
Herein lies the Aristotelian explanation of the difference between the rule 
of thumb method and the scientific way of working propounded by both 
the Classical Taylorist Doctrine and Organizational System Theory: tech-
nical knowledge is distinct from experience for the former knows the 
«why» of the activity while the latter does not 7 5. 
Although the productive model is based on theory, it dwells in a 
different ambit from that of theoretical activities 7 6. Whereas the possessor 
of theoretical knowledge is limited to the contemplation of the object, the 
possessor of technical knowledge can put this knowledge into practice; he 
can perform a movement, which is precisely the production process. 
The possession of technical knowledge thus means that the agent 
possesses an internal state for directing an activity according to the princi-
ples of this knowledge. This is what the system model in organizations 
calls the equilibrium state of the system. When explaining knowledge pro-
per to the productive model, the Stagyrite affirms thus: All arts, i.e. all pro-
ductive forms of knowledge, are potentialities. They are principles of 
change in another thing or in the artist himself considered as other 7 7. 
As form of knowledge which directs movement, it is the role of ra-
tionality to be used within a particular situation, using the object possessed 
by productive knowledge as its point of departure. 
Having established the Aristotelian view of productive science as 
analogous to theory as propounded by the system model, it must be emp-
hasized that it is the basis for whatever type of adaptation to the environ-
ment. Theory in itself is unable to deal with contingent situation for it is 
eternal. The intellectual faculty in production has a different manner of de-
termination 7 8. 
Technical principles are rules which conduct the activity towards 
the making of the artifact, which is the object of technical knowledge. The 
artifact can be produced in so far as the process is in accordance to the ru-
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les which technical knowledge prescribes. The success of the result de-
pends on whether or not the process of making is in accordance with the 
rules. Thus, the formalization of technical activity into a complex set of ru-
les permits the generation of the output. For the same reason, a disciple is 
capable of making a product under a master who guides his activity. 
Rational potentiality is operation in the productive model. Whereas 
operation has the end in theoretical activity, rational potentiality must also 
take into account the material external reality which affects that activity. 
This matter is that which «creates» the distance between the idea and the 
result of the productive activity 7 9. 
As such, it is reason's role to discern the proper manner of genera-
ting an output within a given temporal situation. This takes the form of de-
liberation. Deliberation consists in calculating which of the available me-
ans can achieve the end in the best possible manner. The searching of 
means therefore implies that they pertain to a model that helps decide 
which one is best. The standard on which technical deliberation is based is 
the object or the idea which operation possesses. The «best means» signi-
fies those things which lead to the artificial product 8 0. 
Once again, system thinking (with the concomitant growth of deci-
sion theory) approximates the postulates of the Aristotelian account of 
technical calculation by assuming that rationality consists in deliberating 
upon the means to an end. The input information provides data about the 
environmental state conducive to performance of the activity. Deliberation 
stops at the moment when the person perceives that information coming 
from the environment does not impede the actualization of his or her po-
tentiality of producing: «If we come on an impossibility, we give up the se-
arch, e.g. if we need money and this cannot be got, but if a thing appears 
possible we try to do it» 8 1 . It is therefore clear that the activity, which pre-
supposes the object, is simply an adaptation to what was previously 
known. 
B . T H E PRODUCTION PROCESS AS THE TEMPORAL 
CONFIGURATION OF THE OBJECT 
To be in act can be said in different ways 8 2 . Aristotle distinguishes 
two types of activity: the perfect and the imperfect. Where does the dis-
tinction lie and what is the characteristic of this distinction? 
The Stagyrite describes the difference between perfect activity and 
imperfect movement in the Metaphysics.: 
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At the same time we are living well and have lived well, and 
are happy and have been happy. If not, the activity would have had 
sometime to cease, as the process of making thin ceases: but as it is, 
it does not cease, we are living and have lived. Of these activities, 
then we must call the one set movements, and the other actualities. 
For every movement is imperfect - making thin, learning, walking, 
building; these are movements, and imperfect movements. For it is 
not true at the same time we are walking and have walked, or are 
building and have built... but it is the same thing that at the same 
time has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought83. 
On the one hand, thinking (that is, operation) is identical to the 
known in act 8 4. This is to say that operation in se immediately captures its 
end or object. When one thinks, the object that is known is already present 
in the act of knowing. The act of knowing is simultaneous to the presence 
of its end. 
On the other hand, productive activities such as the making of an 
edifice proceed in successive stages. The final product is only achieved 
when these stages have been accomplished. Thus, while the process of 
building is still on-going, the final product does not yet exist: the building 
stages have not yet built the edifice. 
From these observations, one can see the difference between opera-
tion and productive process, to wit: the relationship of the activity with res-
pect to the end. Aristotle further clarifies the distinction between operation 
and process by affirming that operation is an end since its object is identi-
cal to the very same activity, while process is not because it has a limit (pe-
rns)*5: 
Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but 
all are relative to the end, e.g. the process of making then is of this 
sort, and the things themselves when one is making then are in this 
way (i.e. without being already that at which the movement aims), 
this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for it is not an 
end); but that in which the end is present is an action86. 
Operation is identified with its end; it is its own end. In contrast, 
processes are activities which are not ends, but rather are means. They are 
transition stages. For this reason, they are called transitive movements. 
The real distinction between imperfect and perfect activities does not lie in 
its origin (that is, the potentiality from which it comes from) but rather in 
their relationship with the end 8 7. 
«It is not true that at the same time we are building and have 
built» 8 8. The act is not fully consummated in the perfect. There is no identi-
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fication between the present and the perfect 8 9. So long as one is building, 
he or she does not have what is built. In other words, the movement of 
building must proceed temporally towards the end and proceeds towards 
the end in stages. Thus, temporality is a quality proper to process. A pro-
cess occurs in «time because it has a limit at which it terminates; and not 
an end in which it reaches its fullness* 9 0. As such, time is not only a quan-
titative measurement of processual activity, but is also a qualification of 
this activity 9 1. 
Unlike operation, production processes are transitive movements. 
They, therefore, behave in a similar manner as natural or physical move-
ments which are also transitive movements. Movement can be defined as 
the act of potency in so far as it is 9 2 . This is in line to what Aristotle ex-
plains that a thing can be in act as movement to potentiality 9 3. 
Act is to potency as movement is to potentiality. Aristotle observes 
that while «art is a principle of movement in something other than the 
thing moved, nature is a principle in the thing itself...*94. The Philosopher 
concedes that technical production is «concemed neither with things that 
are, or come into being, by necessity nor with things that do so in accor-
dance with nature (since these have their origin in themselves)* 9 5. The dif-
ference therefore lies in the potentiality from which each of these proces-
ses originates. While the potentiality which brings about natural processes 
are innate or congenital, the potentiality of technical production is acquired 
through the exercise of the activity: 
As all potentialities are either innate, like the senses, or 
come by practice, like the power of playing the flute, or by lear-
ning, like that of the arts, those which come by practice or by ratio-
nal formula we must acquire by previous exercise, but this is not 
necessary with those which are not of this nature and which imply 
passivity96. 
One can therefore form an idea of the «structure» of the productive 
model as an activity in which rationality and process form the constitutive 
elements. Whereas the source of natural movements are previously given 
potentialities, the source of productive movement are potentialities after 
the exercise of an activity 9 7. 
While the source of natural movements originates from within, un-
natural movements originate from without 9 8. The principle of movement in 
technical activity is found in another: in operation or in the rational poten-
tiality. In contrast, the source of natural movement is found in the moved 
object itself (the «product» proper to generation): 
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For the art is the starting point and form (eidos) of the pro-
duct; only it exists in something else, whereas the movement of na-
ture exists in the product itself, issuing from another nature which 
has the form in actuality". 
The important point of this discussion is however that the form of 
the end of technical process «exists in something else» in contraposition to 
that of a generated natural being. The cited passage speaks of the origin of 
production as something «which has the form in actuality*. Such origin is 
operation. 
Operation, when detached from the material environment, captures 
its end in the very same activity. On the other hand, operation in the pro-
duction model is the determination of the means based upon the abstract 
form or the presupposed end of the deliberation. The privilege of operation 
as foundation of technical activity rests on the fact that it has this end. Ne-
vertheless, the productive model demands the generation of the output. 
This output is the materialized form. 
The form or idea is the artificial product's potential mode of exis-
ting 1 0 0 . The production process materializes the form possessed by opera-
tion and converts it into an output. This implies that productive activity as 
a whole (with its dual dimension of cognition and process) is a transition 
from the form to the materialized output. Technical process transforms the 
idea into actuality (in the form of an output or an artifact). This process re-
quires time. It follows that technical process is the temporal configuration 
of the idea which is possessed by operation 1 0 1. 
To recapitulate: this subsection has shown that the production pro-
cess is equivalent to the state of motion in systemic activity 1 0 2. The Stagyri-
te likewise affirms that process is distinct from operation which is analo-
gous to the concept of equilibrium state within the system model. This 
distinction, however, does not imply that the production process is totally 
independent from rationality. On the contrary, the production process 
transpires in accordance to the productive form of knowledge which is a 
complex set of rules and principles whose aim is the generation of an arti-
fact. This is the fundamental description of a processual activity in organi-
zations. Furthermore, this supposition is what distinguishes production 
process from other physical or natural processes. 
The preceding paragraphs have shown the Aristotelian notion of 
production process. After examining the two dimensions of technical acti-
vity as the correlates of rationality and of process in organizational system 
thinking, it can be concluded that system paradigm of productive activity 
in organizations follows Aristotle's poietic activity. 
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C . THE LIMITS OF THE TECHNICAL MODEL 
The system model of organizational theory assumes that systemic 
activity is negentropic which means that the system strives to achieve an 
energy density higher than its previous level. This takes place as a result of 
storage of received information which, in addition to the information pre-
viously possessed, increases the systemic energy level 1 0 3 . This increase is 
the absorption of the past into the present which enables the system to res-
pond to future contingencies in the environment 1 0 4 . Ashby denominates it 
as «amplification of adaptation* 1 0 5. 
This section will assess the claim that the system model of produc-
tive activity can handle future contingencies under the light of the concepts 
discussed previously. More concretely, the evaluation will focus on two 
points which are intrinsically related to each other. First, does poietic acti-
vity increase the system's potentiality or the energy level thus enabling to 
have further exchanges with the environment? This interrogation serves to 
assess whether or not productive model is a negentropic activity. Second, 
does poietic activity accumulate the past into the present? The question 
then aims if the model assumed by organizational theory is the optimum 
response to future contingencies. 
Productive activity is geared to the generation of the output. In or-
der for this to take place the agent must have an internal stable disposition 
or equilibrium for such a movement. This disposition is precisely that 
which gives the agent the possibility of embarking upon a productive acti-
vity. To be capable of producing means that the agent's potentiality can be 
actualized 1 0 6. 
The principle of productive activity is external to the becoming of 
the product. This means that the production process is not preordained by 
the nature of the moved thing. Furthermore, productive activity takes place 
when there is a conducive situation that warrants its performance 1 0 7. Produc-
tion is simply the realization of the possibilities of the rational potentiality. 
This rational potentiality supplies the productive form of knowledge that 
guides production along its course. An agent that possesses a rational poten-
tiality is capable of producing when the environment is conducive to the ge-
neration of the output. This environmental state is the so-called the passive 
object upon which productive activity works. Rational potentiality will not 
be able to act if this passive object is not present within the environment 1 0 8. 
Thus, although the agent possesses an internal condition for effecting a 
change, another condition must be met, namely the external condition 1 0 9. 
Although the idea is the primordial origin of the output, one must 
also take into consideration the matter out of which the output is to be 
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moulded. This matter from which the output is produced is called the pas-
sive object. Like natural processes, technical activity involves the configu-
ration of matter: 
All things that come to be either by nature or by art have 
matter; for each of them is capable of both being and not being, and 
this capacity is the matter in each1 1 0. 
In order that productive activity may take place, one must search 
for the environmental information conducive for the generation of an out-
put. This actualization concretizes the idea in the appropriate material en-
vironment. It is a transportation of the form into the matter by means of the 
production process 1 1 1 . This is the Aristotelian way of describing adaptation 
through equilibrium fit 1 1 2. 
Actualization involves stages towards the eventual accomplishment 
of the output. In the act of building for example «the fitting together of the 
stones is different from the fluting of the column, and these are both diffe-
rent from the making* 1 1 3 of the edifice. The actualization of potentiality in 
technical activities is a passage from one stage to a succeeding stage and 
involves the gradual transportation of the form into the external material 
world. These stages form a feedback chain involving operation and the 
production process: 
that which proceeds from the starting-point and the form is 
thinking, and that which proceeds from the final step of the thin-
king is making. And each of the intermediate steps is taken in the 
same way"4. 
«It is not true that at the same time we are building and have built». 
The actualization of the production process ceases when the process has 
reached its end. This end is external to the movement. Thus, the actualiza-
tion of the production process involves an imperfect movement. 
In the production model, the end, or more precisely the limit, of a 
process is its output. The complete actualization of the process results in 
the output. Thus, output is nothing but actuality, the realization of poten-
tiality 1 1 5. Potentiality and actuality are «complementary aspects of a sin-
gle fact» 1 1 6 . This implies that during the passage from potentiality to ac-
tuality, the increase of actuality implies a corresponding reduction of 
potentiality. 
Prior to the production process, the agent finds itself in an initial 
state of potentiality for making an output. During the incipient stages of 
the process, there is more potentiality than actuality. In other words, the 
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idea has not yet been materialized in the finished product; rather, the trans-
portation of the form into the matter involved in production is under way. 
Consequently, actualization implies that the increase in actuality is com-
municated into the matter in which the completion of the production acti-
vity will later be found. 
When the production process draws closer to its final stages, actua-
lity is greater than potentiality. Departing from its initial potential state, 
technical activity leaves behind the previous stages. As it progresses, the 
process spends its initial resources: it loses potency. All this implies a loss 
of its initial energy and the subsequent loss of its ability to do work. The 
loss of energy also means that the process is entropic and therefore irrever-
sible. An important implication of this observation is that production sha-
res a characteristic proper of whatever type of natural or material proces-
ses, to wit: irreversibility. 
The terminus in productive activity is the product. Stated in other 
words, productive activity is the transportation of a form into the matter by 
means of the production process and implies the actualization of the ratio-
nal potentiality. This actualization, however, is solely external: the actua-
lity generated is not preserved by the agent, but remains in the external 
product. 
What then is the.state of the agent at the end of the productive acti-
vity? The agent's final state is equivalent to its initial state since actuality 
is not conserved in the agent, rather it is consumed and lost to the external 
environment. The conclusion is that the productive model is entropic be-
cause it loses the energy (actuality) to the external environment and there-
fore does not contribute to an increase in the agent's potentiality. 
In its entirety, productive activity is a transitive movement. As 
such, the production model consists of the mover, the moved, and the ini-
tial and final situations of the activity. Apart from the three constitutive 
elements, productive activity involves time like all types of processual mo-
vement. The temporal aspect of technical activity is inherent to it because 
it is a processual movement which involves a movement from an initial si-
tuation to a final situation: 
We have, then, the following factors: mat which directly 
causes motion, and that which is in motion; further, that in which 
motion takes place, namely time, and (distinct from these three) 
that from which and to which it proceeds (for every motion proce-
eds from something and to something, that which is directly in mo-
tion being distinct from that to which it is in motion and that from 
which it is in motion...)"7. 
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Aristotle affirms that «it is not possible to move otherwise in terms 
of time» 1 1 8 . Productive activity is therefore is in consideration of time 1 1 9 . As 
seen earlier, it is precisely in the posterior dimension of technical activity 
(that is, the production process) that the «materialization of the idea» takes 
place 1 2 0 . This «materialization of idea» is the actualization of the potential 
state, an actualization that is a linear passage which begins with an initial 
and concludes in a final situation. From this viewpoint, production activity 
can be considered in terms of a precedent-antecedent relationship 1 2 1. 
It is in this «whence-whither» relationship of movement that time is 
captured 1 2 2 . This notion of time as something which is inherent in move-
ment reveals that it is not merely a quantifier of movement. Rather, time is 
also a quality which describes the progress of the actualization in terms of 
its numerical distension toward its final situation 1 2 3. For this reason, move-
ment can be measured according to time 1 2 4 . 
Time is the flux between «before» and «after». Now, if actualiza-
tion is a succession of stages, then such stages can be measured according 
to a «before» and an «after»: 
And this transition (the temporal transition) is not only con-
tinuous, but it also has direction. Each «present-now» is not limited 
to being between the other nows, but it is a now that goes «from-to». 
And this is precisely what gives it a direction whence-whither'2i. 
The initial state previous to actualization signifies that the activity 
has a future. When the initial stages of production process are realized, 
productive activity leaves such stages. This denotes that the «now» (the 
production-in-process) has consumed the past. This consumption of the 
past also implies that the activity has less future. To proceed towards suc-
cessive stages means that the activity at the present moment has simultane-
ously left the past and destroyed the future. This is so because process is 
a tension towards its terminus and its progress presupposes 
an expenditure of the initial resources, that is the potential. It im-
plies the loss of initial energy. Consequently, it is an entropic and 
irreversible activity. That it is irreversible signifies that in that the 
measure that it progresses it becomes less potent and faces less of a 
future126. 
Recall that as processual movement, production is a transition stage 
whose end is its limit. This affirmation signifies that when this end is rea-
ched, the entire productive activity ceases. Taking this in the context of 
time, the future of the activity is destroyed upon the complete realization 
of the activity. 
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Time is continuous: «present time joins on to both past time and fu-
ture t ime» 1 2 7 . The past is linked with the present which is in turn linked 
with the future: time is the flux of a now which exists from a before that 
has ceased to exist to an after that does not yet exist. From this, one may 
derive a temporal description of an on-going production stage: it is a now 
which has departed from a completed stage and which is on its way to a 
stage following the present. This description can be further applied to pro-
ductive activity as a whole. Thus, the future of productive activity is speci-
fically linked to and depends on the past. 
The past of a productive activity is the so-called model or the sub-
jectively known which guides the production process toward the fabricated 
product. Arendt affirms that 
the image or model whose shape guides the fabrication pro-
cess not only preceded it, but does not disappear with the finished 
product, which it survives intact...'28. 
The future of a production model is firmly anchored on the past. 
Thus, the so-called future of productive activity is nothing but the anticipa-
tion of the past. As a consequence, no novelty is produced by technical ac-
tivity. The crux of the matter in the productive-system model 's insuffi-
ciency is based on the fact that the environmental demand or information 
to which the activity responds is the subjectively known aspect of the envi-
ronment. What provokes novelty and creates the opportunity to increase 
systemic potentiality is the subjectively unknown environmental aspects: 
The external driving force (of the so-called «amplification 
of adaptation*)) is not the subjectively known character of the envi-
ronment to which the system adapts; but rather its subjectively unk-
nown aspects which produce novelty and disturb the adaptation. A 
sufficiently great disturbance creates an opportunity to move the 
system from one of internal equilibrium state to another, more 
complex one1 2 9. 
In the final analysis, the production-system model is not the opti-
mum activity for it responds not to the future and complex environmental 
contingency but rather to the present environment perceived by a limitedly 
rational agent 13°. 
The role of operation in the production model is limited to the pre-
sent time-frame. Its restriction to the present precludes the system to pro-
voke opportunities for action in a highly indeterminate contingent environ-
ment. Thus, although production activity has operation as its Origin, 
operation cannot entirely dominate the entropic characteristic of proces-
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sual movement. Albeit the system has a certain degree of control over its 
environment, it 's activity is partly restricted by the perceived external en-
vironment. 
The directive role of operation in production activity is restricted 
to the determination of the means. Consequently, it disregards the highly 
indeterminate character of the environment. Of course, system model as-
sumes that the environment is highly complex. But what the model pres-
cribes is to restrict systemic response to the known aspects of the environ-
ment. As such, this prevents the system to provoke opportunities to 
proceed its exchanges with a complex environment. In the final analysis, 
the persistence of the agent's activity in such an environment is not feasi-
ble if one were to follow the normative prescription of the system mo-
del 1 3 1 . 
What, then, must be done in order that the agent can handle the fu-
ture? The agent must first be exceptionally resistant to change. Second is 
that in order to deal with an indeterminate environment, it must be open to 
higher degrees of complexity 1 3 2. For this to take place, operation must not 
be restricted to the known. Its directive role consists in opening up and lea-
ding the activity to the unknown. Does Aristotle speak of an activity that 
fits these requirements? 
THE ACTION PARADIGM 
A. ACTION AS PRACTICAL ACTIVITY 
Does Aristotle hold an alternative activity which takes place in con-
tingent situations and which promotes a qualitative increase in the system? 
If he does, this activity must be something distinct from productive acti-
vity. The difference would have to lie in the overcoming of the destruction 
of time which takes place in processual movements. For this to take place, 
the actuality produced in the activity must be conserved in the agent so that 
its potentiality is increased, thereby generating more possibilities for it to 
act in the future. This chapter shall take a look at action which is the sole 
Aristotelian alternative to the production model. 
Aristotle calls the activities which an agent can perform in the con-
tingent level as practical activities. Production, however, is not the only 
type of practical activity. Aristotle admits that, 
Among things that can be otherwise are included both 
things made and things done1 3 3. 
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«Things made» refers to production, «things that are done» refers to 
the ambit of action. Both action and production presuppose reasoned states 
of capacity to do or to make respectively 1 3 4 and are activities directed by 
the intellect. 
Operation, therefore, is the directive element of action, but the exe-
cution and consecution of the end is achieved through a process. The ratio-
nal capacity within the level of action as well as within the level of produc-
tion is acquired through a repetition of acts: 
For the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn 
by doing, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by 
playing the lyre: so too we become just by doing just acts, tempera-
te by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts1 3 5. 
Finality in movements is described as that for the sake of which so-
mething is done. Aristotle posits that the nature of the end is good since 
good «is found in the field of action and movement, and it is the first mo-
ver; for that is the nature of the end» 1 3 6 . Aristotle maintains that the good 
can be said in many ways 1 3 7 . 
Thus, the good for a certain activity is not the good for another. In 
the case of medicine, the good is health, or in the case of architecture, the 
good is the edifice 1 3 8. These two activities have their end-result external to 
them; they are thus imperfect activities and belong to the ambit of produc-
tion. On the other extreme, the good of an intellectual operation is the ob-
ject of the very same activity. Since the end and the activity are identical to 
each other, Aristotle holds that it is a perfect activity. For this reason, he 
states that it is the highest form of activity: 
Now this would seem to be in agreement both with what 
we said before and with the truth. For this activity is the best (since 
not only is intellect the best thing in us, but the objects of intellect 
are the best of knowable objects); and secondly, it is the most con-
tinuous, since we can contemplate truth more continuously than we 
can do anything139. 
This, however, does not signify that one must dwell exclusively in 
this activity to the point of neglecting practical activities. In fact, theoreti-
cal activity is proper to an omniscient being. Aristotle sees that the thin-
king of the gods is a self-conditioned and self-contained activity: a thin-
king of thinking 1 4 0 . This absolute activity does not take place in man for he 
cannot sustain a continuous activity. All human activities are incapable of 
being sustained indefinitely since «our nature is not simple but there is 
another element in us as well, inasmuch as we are perishable creatures» 1 4 1. 
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The individual person is not a self-contained intellect; he is inserted in a 
contingent world. Although man is a unique being, he is still a being 
among other corporeal beings 1 4 2 . He is therefore subject to contingen-
cies' 4 3 . 
With things standing as such, it would be absurd to consider pro-
ductive activity as the highest activity which an agent can perform in con-
tingent affairs, and to deny the primordial place of reason in man. On the 
contrary, the proper perspective of looking at the different types of activity 
which man can perform should be taken under the light of a hierarchy of 
activities 1 4 4. 
Strictly speaking, productive activity «is merely useful and for the 
sake of something else» 1 4 5 . As has been repeatedly underlined, this is so 
because in production model (an imperfect activity), operation does not 
play a complete directive role in the agent's handling of contingent situa-
tions; it loses its directive role in favor of the process which externalizes 
the actuality. 
In so far as operation is superior to process, the effective handling 
of future contingenecies will depend on whether or not operation domina-
tes and controls processual movements. The desired type of activity would 
then be an activity in which the superior element completely dominates the 
inferior one 1 4 6 . This type of activity must effectively handle contingent si-
tuations without restricting the directive power of operation. It must be an 
activity which shares the characteristics of productive activity and intellec-
tual operation. 
Aristotle distinguishes action from production in the following pas-
sage: 
For while making has an end other than itself, action can-
not; for good action itself is its end1 4 7. 
Recall that Aristotle distinguishes activities according to the rela-
tion which they have with their ends: imperfect activities are a type of mo-
vement whose end is external to itself; perfect activities are movements 
whose end is in itself. Once again, the Stagyrite's assertion on the behavior 
of the activity towards its end. 
Moreover, Aristotle implies that action is superior to production 
since the relation of action to end is analogous to the relation which inte-
llectual operation has to its object. In other words, action, like intellectual 
operation has possession of its end. This similarity is, however, not absolu-
te since action possesses a processual dimension, while operation does 
not 1 4 8 . 
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B. THE NEGENTROPIC NATURE OF ACTION 
Recalling the limitations of the production model, the action model 
would be the optimum activity for handling future events, if it could be 
shown that action is a negentropic activity. Thus, this section shall attempt 
to answer the following queries: 
1) Is action an activity which avoids the loss of actuality so 
proper of entropic activities exercised in a contingent environment? 
2) Does action possess a temporal characteristic which 
does not preclude the divorce of the present from the past, thereby 
enabling the agent to pursue its activity in the future? 
The rational capacity for acting is acquired through repetitive exer-
cise of deeds. Indeed, Aristotle affirms that action involves a processual 
movement as shown when he compares the acquisition of potentialities in 
action with that of production: «the excellences we get by first exercising 
them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well» 1 4 9 . 
At first glance, action seems to consist in a feedback process similar 
to that of production. Movement precedes the capacity which, in turn, pro-
vides the stable disposition to produce the movement. It has been seen in 
the previous chapters that in the production model, thinking precedes ma-
king. Production in its intermediate stages is a cyclic process involving 
thinking and making 1 5 0 . This progressive actualization continues until it at-
tains the external result, the product. The modification that takes place in 
production is an external modification of matter which does not modify in 
any way the potentiality involved in the activity. 
Action is, however, more than a feedback process. The excellences 
(or the virtues) are acquired when the following movement occurs: first is 
the passage from a natural disposition to its movement and then, through 
the exercise of such acts which results in the possession of the virtues 1 5 1 . In 
contrast to the externalization of the actuality which takes place in the pro-
duction model, the actuality in the action model is internally possessed. 
The production model results solely in an external modification in produc-
tion while the action model involves an additional internal modification of 
the agent's potentialities and thus results in the constant perfectioning of 
these potentialities 1 5 2. 
Unlike pure physical movements, action is not a linear movement 
towards its end. Neither is it a movement consisting of successive feed-
back stages whose end is external to them. Rather, the reiterative exerci-
se of actions leads to a consequent and continuous perfectioning -of the 
agent's state. 
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The act proper to the state of acting is a movement. As such it is 
continuous and that which is continous can take «more, less, or an equal 
amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us, and 
the equal is an intermediate between excess and defect* 1 5 3 . This interme-
diate or established condition is habit. Habit is a quality of a faculty which 
has not been specified by nature. For this reason, it is sometimes called a 
second nature: «habit is hard to change just because it is like nature* 1 5 4 . If 
the movement leads the faculty to an excess or defect, the habit is called 
vice. In the case of a good action (that is, the movement to the intermedia-
te) the established state is denominated as virtue, which is the actuality re-
sulting from such an action 1 5 5. 
Action (more precisely, good action) is a practical activity which 
refers back to the initial state thereby potentializing it. This optimization 
implies an improvement of the initial state which brings with it a quantita-
tive increment and a qualitative improvement of future actions: 
We may remark, then, that every excellence both brings 
into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence and ma-
kes the work of that thing be done well.... Therefore, if this is true 
in every case, the excellence of man also will be the state which 
makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well1 5 6. 
To possess something signifies to have that thing. To have is «a 
kind of activity of the haver and the had-something like an action or move-
ment* 1 5 7 . The manner of possessing in the action model is different from 
that in the production model. From the prism of the action model, the ex-
ternal result is an insufficient indicator of a well performed activity. A well 
performed action largely depends on the agent's state: 
Again, the case of the arts and of the excellences are not si-
milar; for the products of the arts have their goodness in themsel-
ves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain character, 
but if the acts that are in accordance with the excellences have 
themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done 
justly or temperately. The agent must also be in a certain condition 
when he does them'58. 
While production activity ceases when the external result is achie-
ved 1 5 9 , the action model demands a process of optimization in the face of 
an indeterminate future. It demands a continuous growth in the agent's 
conduct: «for it is activities exercised on particular objects that make the 
corresponding character. This is plain from the case of people training any 
contest or action; they practise the activity the whole t ime* 1 6 0 . 
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Translating this into systemic terms, the action model acts as a sys-
temic activity in a contingent environment which results in an equilibrium 
state which is higher than the initial state. Thus, by realizing good actions 
in an uncertain world, the agent gains the capacity to do more and better 
actions in the future. However, the realization of these good actions signi-
fies that the activity takes time. Is «active time» the same as transitive 
time? 
An inherent characteristic of systemic activity that takes place in 
an environment is the linear temporal passage which brings with it the 
destruction of the future. It can be recalled that in transitive movements 
(be it natural or productive), the past is not conserved and, at the same 
time, the future is reduced. In the case of productive activity, this tempo-
ral destruction takes place due to the fact that the actualization is progres-
sively externalized and eventually terminates at its limit, the output. Thus, 
productive activity is entropic and is ineffective in dealing with future 
contingencies since its development leads to a reduction of the system's 
capability to act in the future: when the activity reaches its end, or limit, it 
ceases to exist. 
In contrast, the temporal passage in the action model results not in 
consumption, but rather in temporal enrichment. The movement involved 
in action is not solely a pure tendency towards an external end. The actua-
lization involved in the action model reverts back to the initial condition 
and implies the consequent increase in the agent's potentialities. Through 
action, the faculties' acts are reflexive and tend toward an end in such a 
way that the «energy level» at the final state of the activity is higher than 
what it was at its initial departure point. 
Just as action and production differ from each other by the different 
relations which they have with their ends, there is a parallel distinction bet-
ween active time and productive time. The internal possession of the ac-
tuality which is a result of action prevents the temporal passage from being 
a mere linear succession. The inherence of the actuality in the faculty 
which enables its further potentialization demands a modality ot time whe-
rein the past is conserved in the present, making possible the future 1 6 1. 
The temporal peculiarity of the action model stems from the fact 
that the performance of good actions impedes the temporal destruction 
which is so proper of activities that take place in a contingent world. It 
does so by preserving the past in the present while, at the same time, it pre-
pares for the future. The circularity of «active time» must not be understo-
od in the sense that it is a repetitive cycle which produces nothing new. 
The circularity of active time does not terminate at the same point from 
where the activity began; circular active time is a temporal progression in 
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crescendo wherein the past is continuously accumulated with the view of 
proceeding further to the future. 
The past accumulated in the present which, in turn, permits the fu-
ture horizon to remain open produces habit. The acquired habit resulting 
from action absorbs time and avoids temporal consumption. Rather than 
losing time, acquiring habits is the manner of gaining time 1 6 2 . Therefore, in 
the action model, time, under the guise of habit, becomes an «ingredient» 
for the agent's constitution: 
While time is indeed pure succession in the case of things, 
time for the rational being, such as man, becomes an ingredient of 
its own constitution. This happens under the form of habit"3. 
Having conserved and accumulated the past, habit opens up the fu-
ture to further actions in so far as they are of a specific and determined 
quality. Active time points out the propriety of the future exercise of better 
actions. It indicates when the right occasion is present for the intervention 
in a contingent event. Aristotle affirms that «active time», being an oppor-
tunity, is analogous to the category of the good: 
Further, since things are said to be good in as many ways as 
they are said to be (for things are called good both in the category 
of substance, as God and reason, and in quality, e.g. the virtues, ... 
and in time, e.g. the right opportunity...)164. 
While it is true that the action paradigm requires the temporal per-
formance of its activity in order to attain its end, there is, nevertheless, a 
certain simultaneous attainment of the end within the very same activity. 
This is not the case of production whose end is external to the act of ma-
king: 
Now those activities are desirable in themselves from 
which nothing is sought beyond the activity. And of this nature ex-
cellent actions are thought to be, for to do noble and good deeds is 
a thing desirable for its own sake165. 
Since the primary aim of the study is not the exhaustive investiga-
tion of the differences between action and operation, this present discus-
sion will focus only on the temporal predication between the present and 
the perfect: 
Whenever there exists a perfect praxis, the possession of 
the end necessarily exists. On the contrary, when a moral praxis 
(action) is realized, it tends towards an end which is not yet posses-
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sed and when it is possessed, it ends in a certain way. Thus, the si-
multaneous predication of the present and the perfect cannot, at le-
ast in the same sense, be applied to the ethical praxis. 1 see and 
have seen, but I am not brave and I have been brave. This simulta-
neity can only be maintained through habituation, that is, because I 
possess the virtue of courage I am brave, and I am precisely becau-
se I have been, because I have realized courageous actions166. 
Action is not a perfect activity because it does not achieve its end 
with only one single act; rather its end is gradually captured through habi-
tuation. The involvement of materiality in action is the basis of its distinc-
tion from intellectual operation. Matter is responsible for the gap between 
the potentiality and its attainment of the end. Whereas operation only in-
volves the intellectual faculties, action involves the entire composite natu-
re of the agent: «for deeds many things are needed, and more, the greater 
and the nobler the deeds are. But the man who is contemplating the truth 
needs no such thing, at least with a view to the exercise of his activity* 1 6 7. 
C . THE STRUCTURE OF THE ACTION PARADIGM 
It has been said that time in action is not a consumption or an ex-
penditure of time; rather, action accumulates the past in the present under 
the form of habit. As such, active time provokes the opportunity for carr-
ying out a well performed action. 
In systemic terms, the provocation of an opportunity implies the 
continuation of further systemic activities in an uncertain environment. 
This cannot take place in the production model since the future of produc-
tion is anchored on the known, presupposed end. Now, if action provokes 
more and better actions, then the structure of the action paradigm includes 
the possibility of openness to the unknown. Furthermore, this aperture to 
the unknown allows the system to move up to higher degrees of equili-
bria"'8. 
This section has the task of determining whether or not the structu-
re of the action model complies with the criteria set above. Action, like 
production, is a practical activity. As such, it has operation as principle and 
involves a processual movement. Included in this discussion is the suffi-
ciency of the action model for providing a proper account of operation's 
complete directive role in the performance of activities in a contingent 
world. 
Now, operation in itself is incapable of producing movement in the 
action model. It requires a potentiality which brings it down into the tern-
5 8 RAÚL M. ASUNCIÓN 
poral thereby converting itself into something practical. This potentiality is 
called desire or tendency 1 6 9. Tendency is that which «is every form of it re-
lative to an end» 1 7 0 . This aperture to the end is the initial state of tendency. 
In this stage, the faculty is not yet actualized 1 7 1. 
Tendency in its initial state is aperture to the ultimate good which 
agent subjectively does not yet know 1 7 2 . For the tendential potentiality, this 
ultimate, unknown good is in the future: 
...to have a relation with the end is merely potential, or 
transcendental, it is not in the end nor in the possession of the 
end.... This is equivalent to placing the eminence of future in hu-
man biographical time: we live openly to a future which does not 
end while we are alive, that is, to a future which does not cease to 
be, a «non-defuturizable» future. To relate oneself with the end in a 
strictly potential manner connotes that the end is totally in the futu-
re 1 7 3. 
Now, the end to which tendency naturally refers is the chief good. 
Aristotle describes this chief good or «non-defuturizable» future as «that 
for whose sake everything else is done» 1 7 4 or «an unqualified end» 1 7 5 . It is 
the ultimate good for which any agent naturally yearns 1 7 6 . Thus, the apertu-
re to the unknown future is the natural configuration of tendency previous 
to its actualization 1 7 7. 
The preliminary stage of the action model is the actualization of the 
tendential potentiality towards a particular thing. The Stagyrite says that, 
among the factors involved in movement, there must exist something 
which originates movement. This origin «may mean either something 
which itself is unmoved or that which at once moves and is moved» 1 7 8 . 
«That which is unmoved» is the external object, that «which at once moves 
and is moved» is tendency: 
...that which at once moves and is moved is the faculty of 
appetite (for that which is moved is moved insofar as it desires, and 
appetite in the sense of actual appetite is a kind of movement)179. 
What the Philosopher implies in this passage is that the incipient 
stage of the action model is a processual movement towards a particular 
thing or occasion 1 8 0 . In accordance with the agent's insertion in the contin-
gent environment, the actualization of the tendential potentiality towards 
the subjectively unknown is by perceiving a particular thing 1 8 1 . 
The tendential potentiality develops toward the object once the si-
tuation presents itself to the agent. Since this actualization is processual, it 
is an imperfect movement. This preliminary stage contains no deliberation 
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or rational discourse 1 8 2. The process of the tendential faculty begins, there-
fore, with the incipient development of action: 
That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the fa-
culty of appetite.... As it is, thought is never found producing mo-
vement without appetite (for wish is a form of appettite; and when 
movement is produced according to calculation it is also according 
to wish), but appetite can originate movement contrary to calcula-
tion, for desire is a form of appetite183. 
This, in essence, is the first stage of the action model, namely: a 
processual movement which pertains to the tendential faculty whose initial 
condition is an absolute aperture to the unknown. In contrast to the produc-
tion model whose future is anchored to the known, the future of the action 
paradigm is anchored on the unknown. At this point, however, the tenden-
tial faculty is not yet actualized. Its actualization commences when the 
agent perceives a particular thing in the environment. The Stagyrite af-
firms that this is a processual movement towards the thing. 
It has been seen that processual movements destroy the temporal 
horizon of the activity. This is the case in production and may also be the 
case during the initial stage of the action model, that is, in the processual 
moment. In other words, action's initial aperture to the future may give 
way to a mere conformity with the present, especially if the tendency is left 
unattended by operation: 
The man who solely uses sensible perception usually con-
forms with immediate goods. This is how human time is disorgani-
zed. From the temporal point of view, ethics is the organization of 
biographical time; that is, it permits man to live in time without gi-
ving in to the discontinuities of what is in fashion.... If the will, ho-
wever, is moved solely by the capturing of immediate goods, long-
term projects are ignored184. 
The foregoing discussion studied the role of the tendential process 
plays in the action model when pursuing the future. It must be reminded 
that the action model precludes the externalization of the actuality, thereby 
giving the agent the possibility of proceeding to the future. In contrasting 
to the production model, it seems that the principle of action, operation, 
exercises a more complete directive role in the performance of the activity. 
The incompetence of theoretical knowledge in practical affairs is 
repeatedly underlined during Aristotle's discourse of practical activities 1 8 5. 
Its incompetence is based on the fact that the object known in operatiort as 
activity per se is different from the object known by operation in the action 
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paradigm: «...practical thought.. . differs from speculative thought in the 
character of its end...» 1 8 6. For this reason, operation must be brought down 
to the practical so that its role as the foundation of action may be maintai-
ned 1 8 7. 
The speculative intellect ignores the practical good. In the action 
model, practical end cannot be directly captured by reason because opera-
tion per se dwells within the ambit of the necessary. As such, operation 
must «descend» from the necessary to the contingent level 1 8 8 . The manner 
by which this descent takes place may be gleaned from the following pas-
sage: 
Mind as speculative never thinks what is practicable, it ne-
ver says anything about an object to be avoided or pursued, while 
this movement is always in something which is avoiding or pur-
suing an object189. 
The pursuit towards an object is a processual movement. More pre-
cisely, this is the actualization of the tendential faculty. In this process, the 
potentiality (in this case, tendency) is moved by a particular thing which, 
in turn, is presented to reason by the same potentiality. 
The thing desired is not, however, just any kind of object, but rather 
something more: In the first place it is a future object in the contingent 
world 1 9 0. Secondly, it is something which, given the specific contingent si-
tuation, appears to be within the reach of the agent 1 9 1 . Thus, the action mo-
del demands the object to be achievable by the agent's own efforts: 
That is why, though in any case it is the object of appetite 
which originates movement, this object may be either the real or 
the apparent good. To produce movement the object must be more 
than this: it must be good that can be brought into being by action; 
and only what can be otherwise than as it is can thus be brought 
into being192. 
In order to realize its end, the agent requires another potentiality 
which points out the means by which this good can be achieved. This po-
tentiality is operation applied in action, namely: the practical intellect. 
Thus, Aristotle affirms that both practical intellect and tendency are the 
sources of action: 
Both of these then are capable of originating local move-
ment, thought and appetite: thought, that is, which calculates me-
ans to an end, i.e. practical thought...; while appetite is in every 
form of it relative to an end; for that which is the object of appetite 
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is the stimulant of practical thought; and that which is last in the 
process of thinking is the beginning of the action193. 
Tendency alone cannot proceed towards the end unless it perceives 
something. In order to do this, it must move from its initial state to a state 
in which it maintains contact with reason 1 9 4. For this reason, it is said that 
nothing is desired unless it is known. On the other hand, reason cannot be 
practical without the tendential process towards particular end: nothing is 
known unless it is desired. 
Thus, the stage which follows the processual stage consists of a mu-
tual dialogue between reason (or practical thought) and tendency. To say 
that practical thought and tendency are the sources of action is to imply 
that the two of them together form the principle of action: 
It follows that there is a justification for regarding these 
two as the sources of movement, i.e. appetite and practical thought, 
for the object of appetite starts a movement and as a result of that 
thought gives rise to movement, the object of appetite being to it a 
source of stimulation195. 
This principle of action is what Aristotle calls choice: 
The origin of action —its efficient, not its final cause— is 
choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an 
end1 9 6. 
When the dialogue between reason and tendency is reached, ten-
dency ceases to be pure desire and becomes intellectual desire; while the 
intellect becomes desiderative intellect: «Choice is either desiderative 
thought or intellectual desire» 1 9 7 . This reciprocal relationship which exists 
between the two constitutive elements of the action model shows that rea-
son directs the irrational element of activity, contrary to the assumption of 
organizational system thinking on the individual's tendency. According to 
system thinking, tendency is an obstacle to the execution of activity; in 
contrast, the action model assumes that tendency plays a key role in the 
performance of activities. 
Heretofore, there is a simultaneity between operation and process. 
In production, operation is external to process, while in action, operation is 
co-simultaneous with process. This simultaneity is internal to the activity. 
Since both operation and the process are coimplicated, and since they form 
two dimensions in one single activity, a more appropriate term would be 
«co-simultaneity». Operation and process are united in such a manner that 
the operation's projection unto the process is immanent. This «structural» 
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characteristic of the action model distinguishes it from the production mo-
del wherein the projection of the operation upon the processual component 
is ab extram. 
Albeit the activity proceeds initially from a processual movement, 
the tendential process is accompanied by an intellectual operation, thereby 
constituting an action whose principle is the agent himself: 
for good action is an end, and desire aims at this. Hence 
choice is either desiderative thought or intellectual desire and such 
an origin of action is a man' 9 9. 
This intimate interplay between tendency and intellectual operation 
does not, however, mean that they are identifiable with each other. Each 
preserves its sphere: the mutual dialogue implies that each one performs its 
proper and specific role. The first component, the tendential process, pro-
vides the end. Operation, the second element, accepts this end and determi-
nes the means which lead to that end: 
The object of choice being one of the things in our own po-
wer which is desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate 
desire of things in our own power; for when we have decided as a 
result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our delibera-
tion200. 
This directive role of operation is deliberation: the determination of 
the means within one's reach in order to arrive at the end 2 0 1 . However, the 
function of operation in the action model must not be confused with its 
role in the production model. Aristotle affirms this when he distinguishes 
between action and production: 
since it is impossible to deliberate about things that are of 
necessity, practical wisdom cannot be knowledge nor art; not 
knowledge because that which can be done is capable of being ot-
herwise, not art because action and making are different kinds of 
thing.... For while making has an end other than itself, action can-
not; for good action itself is its end202. 
Every activity has an end. For production, this end is external to the 
activity itself. Poietic activity is not concerned with the already predeter-
mined end, but with how this end can be achieved: it only searches the me-
ans to realize the end. These means are instrumental for the attainment of 
the end and are called external means. In one of his explanations about the 
process of making, Aristotle speaks of rubbing one's body to produce 
warmth thereby producing a uniform state of body. In this example, the ex-
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ternal means to the end (to wit, the uniform state of body) is rubbing an in-
dividual's body 2 0 3 . 
On the other hand, praxis deals with the realization of actions 
which are considered as valuable in themselves, but which are chosen for 
another thing. The actions chosen by the agent are internal means which 
constitute the end; in other words, the means are parts of the end 2 0 4 . The 
agent searches for the activity for its own sake in so far as it is performed 
in view of another thing: 
What sort of good would one call good in themselves? Is it 
those that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as inte-
lligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honors? Certainly, if we 
pursue those also for the sake of something else, yet one would pla-
ce them among things good in themselves205. 
The use of operation in production is imperfect because it deals 
only with the means. This type of deliberation, which deals solely with the 
means and which lackes due consideration of the end is called cleverness. 
Production is an activity which is principally concerned with the means. 
Technique is based upon the rational dimension which determines the me-
ans and disregards the tendential dimension which provides the agent with 
an aperture to the unknown. Production is not concerned with the appro-
priateness of the pursued end in a given situation; whatever the situation is, 
the agent remains in the same state of equilibrium, both before and after 
the activity. 
In contrast, the use of operation in action is perfect because the de-
liberation is directed towards the incorporation of the finality which has 
been supplied by tendency. The principle of action is choice, the dialogue 
between reason and tendency. While reason determines the means, ten-
dency points out the end. As such, action is concerned with the determina-
tion of both the means and the end. Indeed, the search of the means in a 
contingent situation is a constitutive element of action 2 0 6 . Deliberation in 
action dwells within the realm where there is a high degree of uncertainty 
with respect to the outcome and where there are no fixed rules: 
Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a cer-
tain way for the most part, but in which the event is obscure, and 
with things in which it is indeterminate207. 
The reason for this is that, in action, reason interacts with tendency 
which is the condition of possibility for the processual aperture to the unk-
nown. More precisely, when choosing, reason departs from the object desi-
red and returns and terminates in the same object. In action, «deliberation, 
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then, is a process of reasoning which starts with a desire and ends with a 
desire: it leads from volition to decision» 2 0 8 . 
In sum, the use of operation in action is perfect. Although it has a 
processual component, operation's projection unto process is immanent: 
this projection is depicted as the incorporation of the finality into the ope-
ration. It does not, however, completely reveal the ultimate good to which 
natural tendency refers since the known object is something particular. 
This is so because reason determines in each action what should be desired 
in particular circumstances: 
It is evident that reason, acting as active principle, cannot 
attain a complete dominion over the appetitive faculty with just one 
act. This is the case because appetite is in relation to many objects 
and is determinable in several ways, while reason judges in each 
act what should be desired in these particular circumstances. The-
refore, it is evident that one act of reason is insufficient in obtaining 
the object to which the appetitive potentiality naturally tends in 
every situation. This is proper of the habit of the virtue. As a conse-
quence, the habit of the virtue demands for its formation not one, 
but rather a reiterated series of acts2 0 9. 
It is within this context that the apprehension of the unknown future 
must increase 2 1 0. 
The stages elucidated hitherto are stages previous to the acquisition 
of habit. Habit is the past conserved in the present which keeps the future 
open for further actions. It brings a qualitative and a quantitative improve-
ment in the agent who has performed wel l 2 " . This section will investigate 
the role of habit (or virtue) in ensuring the agent's continuous pursuit to 
the subjectively unknown. 
In the production model, operation precedes the processual move-
ment which gives rise to the externalization of the actuality. In production, 
operation deals only with the means and leaves aside any consideration of 
an aperture to the unknown end 2 1 2 . This imperfect use of reason in produc-
tion is called cleverness; it is a disposition which can be used without due 
regard for the pursuit of the absolute good: 
There is a faculty which is called cleverness; and this is 
such as to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark we 
have set before ouselves, and to hit it. Now if the mark be noble, 
the cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad, the cleverness is 
mere villainy; hence we call clever both men of practical wisdom 
and villains213. 
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Although the initial stage of action is processual, operation projects 
itself upon process in such a way that the the finality of the former is incor-
porated or apprehended by the latter. Thus, operation in action does not 
dwell solely with means, but also captures the specific finality to which 
process tends. Thus, prudence, the disposition of searching for the adequa-
te means in due consideration of the ultimate end, has cleverness as its ini-
tial state, but cannot be identified with this 2 1 4 . 
Nevertheless, the succeeding state can only be attained if it is sup-
plied with the proper end. The performance of a good action requires not 
only prudence but also virtue 2 1 5. The presence of virtue is necessary because 
«the choice will not be right without practical wisdom any more than wit-
hout excellence* 2 1 6 . The necessity of right choice in acting well warrants 
that the faculty which refers to the end (the tendency) must become good. 
As shown in the first part of this section, the condition of possibility for the 
aperture to the unknown future is the tendential faculty. Tendency, upon re-
ceiving a stimulus from a particular thing or situation in the environment, 
proceeds towards the future through a processual movement. This actuali-
zation is, however, insufficient for proceeding towards the unknown since 
tendency by itself is blind; it needs to be rectified by thought in order to re-
main open to the future 2 1 7. This rectitude of tendency is called a good habit 
or virtue which, as seen in the previous chapter, is acquired in time through 
a repetition of actions. Therefore, just as prudence has cleverness for its ini-
tial state, the initial state of virtue is natural tendency: 
We must therefore consider excellence once more; for 
virtue too is similarly related; as practical wisdom is to cleverness 
—not the same, but like it— so is natural excellence to excellence 
in the strict sense2 1 8. 
The co-simultaneity between prudence and virtue is merely the co-
simultaneity in the initial level in which there is an interplay between prac-
tical reason and tendency 2 1 9 . This is to say that the level posterior to the ini-
tial occurs after doing a good action. Recall that the principle of action is 
choice whose constitutents are reason and tendency. While tendency is that 
which relates to the end, reason is that which determines the means. If 
what is chosen is good action, it logically follows that the constitutive ele-
ments must likewise be good. Therefore, the co-implication between pru-
dence and virtues is similar to that between practical reason and tendency 
but in a higher and posterior level 2 2 0 : virtue determines the proper object, 
prudence determines the proper means. Aristotle affirms the mutual dialo-
gue between the two potentialized faculties: «for the one (virtue) determi-
nes the end and the other (prudence) makes us do the things that lead-to 
the end» 2 2 1 . 
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In the action model, the past is conserved in the present so that the 
future remains open; this is embodied in virtue. Virtue supplies the person 
with the right objects or situations and strengthens tendency as it gradually 
proceeds to the future. Therefore, the condition of possibility for gradually 
acquiring knowledge of the unknown future is virtue: 
In the face of what must be done, before the end of our con-
duct, the risk is not in error, but in blindness: not seeing in an abso-
lute way. Practical reason sees or does not not see the end; accor-
dingly, it is present or absent. The responsibility for its presence or 
absence lies not with practical reason, but with the will as ten-
dency. Thus, we return once again to virtue, the good habit of the 
will in its tendency to the good, as a condition of possibility for the 
knowledge of the good—. 
The use of operation in good actions gives rise to the capture of par-
ticular ends. Upon apprehending a determined right end, prudence points 
out the proper means according to the specific situation under considera-
tion 2 2 3 . As repeatedly mentioned, the use of the intellect in the action mo-
del is perfect since its role of determining the means precedes the appre-
hension of the specific right end 2 2 4 . Moreover, by means of virtue, which 
strengthens tendency in its progressive pursuit towards the future, opera-
tion gradually unravels and incorporates the unknown future within the dy-
namism of repeating good actions 2 2 5 . 
The affirmation that, in the action model, there is a certain simulta-
neity between the activity and its end can now be more understood. Recall 
that operation in theoretical activity possesses its end immediately. In con-
trast, operation in the action model captures an end which is not yet posses-
sed to which tendency, strengthened by virtue, refers. The contemplation 
of the end in the action model is processual and in conjunction with the 
virtue: 
It is, therefore, necessary to respect the peculiarity of the 
distinct types of knowledge. We contemplate the human good, the 
practical end, through habit, through virtue: we know what we de-
sire and we know well if we desire well. And by desiring well, th-
rough virtue, we can subjectively desire the objective and absolute 
good and, wanting it, we know it2 2 6. 
Having covered the different aspects and phases of the action mo-
del, it can be concluded that this practical activity is superior to the produc-
tion model since it provides the possibility of potentializing the agent's 
state so that he or she can continue in the future despite the inherent uncer-
tainty of a complex environment. Aristotle, thus, states: 
FACING FUTURE CONTINGENCIES 6 7 
If activities are, as we said, what determines the character 
of life, no blessed man can become miserable; for he will never do 
the acts that are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good 
and wise, we think, bears all the chances of life becomingly and al-
ways makes the best of circumstances227. 
CONCLUSION 
In gist, this study shows that system thinking in organizations inte-
grates the incipient notions of productive activity. It is an attempt to search 
for the optimum activity in a highly uncertain environment. The systemic 
paradigm of productive activity is rationally carried out on the basis of the 
environmental information which the agent receives and processes. The 
paradigm is analogous to Aristotle's account of poiesis. Poietic activity is 
likewise performed in a contingent environment. Its principle is the so-ca-
lled productive form of knowledge. The role of rationality in productive 
activity, however, is limited. With the end as presupposed, reason solely 
searches for the means. It does not control the processual component 
which has the task of executing and obtaining the output. Actualization in 
the productive model implies temporal destruction because the actuality is 
externalized. The performance of the production process results in a syste-
mic state equivalent to the initial level which incapacitates the agent to 
perform more and better activities in the future. Thus, in systemic terms, 
productive activity is entropic. 
Utilizing the above concepts as parameters, the alternative activity 
for the effective handling of future contingencies is Aristotle's account of 
praxis. The role of rationality in the action paradigm avoids the temporal 
destruction inherent in processual movements. In contrast to production, 
the end is not presupposed in the action model. Tendency is the faculty 
which refers to the unknown end. In order to be actualized, tendency must 
come in contact with reason. The thing that is known in action is concrete 
and particular such that it does not satisfy the referred end. It is necessary 
to persistently perform actions so that operation can unravel progressively 
the unknown end. This can take place when tendency is strengthened by 
the virtues. Virtue is a good habit which qualifies the faculties to do more 
and better actions in the future. It does not signify the destruction of time 
but rather the gain in and conservation of time. Operation which performs 
its role in the habitual level is denominated as prudence. Functioning in 
tandem with the virtues, prudence determines the proper situation to per-
form a virtuous action. As a consequence of good action, the systemic sta-
te of the agent is higher than the previous level. The increase in systemic 
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state continues as long as the sign of future actions does not change. In this 
context, therefore, action is a negentropic activity. Stated in other words, 
it is the optimum activity for handling future contingencies. 
Concluding this study, the author subscribes to the proposition that 
Aristotle's Theory of Action can indeed open a new frontier for system 
thinking in the corporate structure. It serves as an alternative foundation to 
the productive model. As has been shown, action model proves stronger 
than the technical paradigm. However, the task of building the corporate 
edifice based on this proposed foundation still remains to be done. 
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93. Metaphysics XI, 6: 1048 b 7­10: «But all things are not said on the same 
sense to exist actually, but only by analogy­as A is in В or to В, С is in D 
or to D, for some are as movement to potentiality, and die others a subs­
tance to some sort of matter». 
94. Metaphysics XII, 3: 1070 a 6­8. 
95. Nicomachean Ethics VI, 4: 1140 a 10­14. 
96. Metaphysics IX, 5: 1047 a 30­35. 
97. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics П, 1: 1103 a 25­29, 31: «Again, of all the things 
that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhi­
bit the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by of­
ten seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary 
we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by 
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using them);.... the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by 
doing, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing 
the lyre...». VATTIMO, op. cit., p. 6 6 : «Per questo essa si distingue dalle 
potenze che sono in noi per natura; e anche perché, mentre nel campo 
delle potenze naturali l'esercizio viene dopo il possesso, per la tevcnh 
come per le altre virtù succede l'opposto, il possesso segue e deriva 
dall'esercizio». 
98. Cf. On the Heavens III, 2 : 301 b 16: «Since a source of movement within 
the thing itself is its nature, while a force is a source of movement in so-
mething other than it or in itself qua other, and since movement is always 
due either to nature or to constraint, movement which is natural, as down-
ward movement is to a stone, will be merely accelerated by an external 
force, while an unnatural movement will be due to the force alone». Cf. 
VATTIMO, op. cit., pp. 9-18. 
99. Generation of Animals II, 1: 7 3 5 a 3-5. 
100. Cf. Metaphysics IX, 7: 1049 a 5-10. 
101. Cf. POLO, L., Etica: hacia una version moderna de los lemas clàsicos, 
Universidad Panamericana, Mexico 1993, pp. 2 3 8 - 2 4 0 . 
102. Cf. CHRISTENSON, op. cit., p. 26 : «...the existence of an equilibrium state 
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103. The system exchanges energy or resources with its environment. System 
Theory assumes that the system is subject to the laws of thermodynamics. 
Now, an open system avoids entropy. The Law of Entropy states that 
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maximum, that is, until the energy is distributed in complete uniformity 
throughout the system disenabling the system to have further exchanges 
of energy with its environment. This is precisely what an open system 
tries to avoid. What the system attempts is to be negentropic. 
104. Cf. WIENER, The Human Use of Human Beings, ed. cit., p. 4 5 : «Certain 
kinds of machines and some living organisms —particularly the higher 
living organisms— can...modify their patterns of behavior on the basis 
of past experience so as to achieve specific anti-entropic ends. In these 
higher forms of communicative organisms the environment, considered 
as the past experience of the individual, can modify the pattern of beha-
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105. Cf. ASHBY, Design for a Brain, ed. cit., Chapter 18. 
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106. Cf. BASTONS, M., «Teoría del movimiento: Análisis de actividades y pro-
cesos», in Anuario Filosófico, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (1992), op. cit., p. 207: 
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108. Cf. Metaphysics IX, 3: 1048 a 13-15. 
109. Cf. Metaphysics IX, 7: 1049 a 5-10. 
110. Metaphysics VII, 7:1032 a 20-21. 
111. Cf. Metaphysics VII, 8: 1032 b 11. 
112. Note the similarity of Simon's explanation of the fit between the system 
and the environment. SIMON, H., Las ciencias de lo artificial, Ed. ATE, 
Barcelona 1973, p. 30: «...el comportamiento del sistema no responde 
más que en parte al medio en que se mueve, ya que, en parte también, res-
ponde a las propiedades limitadoras del sistema interior». 
113. Nicomachean Ethics X, 4:1174 a 24. 
114. Metaphysics VII, 7:1032 b 16-18. 
115. Cf. BASTONS, M., «Teoría del movimiento: Análisis de actividades y pro-
cesos», ed. cit., pp.206-207: «...actualidad y potencial no son "cosas" di-
ferentes. No se distinguen porque sean dos estados diferentes, sino dos 
maneras o grados diferentes de ser el mismo estado». 
116. Ross, W.D., Aristotle's Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction 
and Commentary (vol. II), Oxford Clarendon Press, Oxford 1924, p. 241. 
117. Physics V, 1: 224 a 34-224 b 2. 
118. Nicomachean Ethics X, 4: 1174 a 24. 
119. Cf. VATTIMO, op. cit., p. 100. 
120. Cf. POLO, L. , Etica: hacia una versión moderna de los temas clásicos, 
ed.cit., pp. 238-240. 
121. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics X, 4: 1174 b 2: «We have discussed movement 
with precision in another work, but it seems that it is not complete at any 
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and every time, but that the many movements are incomplete and diffe-
rent in kind, since the whence and whither give them their form.» 
122. Cf. Physics IV, 11 : 2 1 8 b 2 0 - 2 2 2 a 10. 
123. Cf. BASTONS, M., El saber práctico según Aristóteles, ed. cit., p. 7 3 : 
«...dejando a un lado, la actividad perfecta, el movimiento como imper-
fecto, es entendido como la distensión de algo hacia el fin, el tiempo, 
como número de ese movimiento, ha de ser comprendido como el núme-
ro de la distensión de la cosa respecto al fin». 
124. Cf. ZUBIRI, X., «El concepto descriptivo del tiempo», in Realitas, Socie-
dad de estudios y publicaciones, Vol. II, , Madrid 1976, p. 3 8 : «es algo 
más radical que línea temporal. Porque el tiempo es línea temporal por ser 
línea de lo procesual. Ahora bien, lo radical no está en el transcurso pro-
cesual de lo real, sino en que el transcurso mismo lo sea de una realidad, 
la cual, por tanto, es procesual como realidad. Entonces, lo real como real 
es algo que "está realizándose"». 
125. BASTONS, M., «Teoría del movimiento: Análisis de actividades y proce-
sos», ed. cit., p. 2 1 5 : «Y ese transcurso no es sólo continuo, sino que ade-
más tiene dirección. Cada «ahora-presente» no se limita a estar-entre los 
demás ahoras, sino que es un ahora que va «de-a». Y esto es precisamen-
te lo que le marca una dirección desde-hacia». 
126. Ibid., pp.212-213: «El proceso es una tensión hacia su término y su avan-
ce supone para el un gasto de los recursos iniciales, es decir, del poten-
cial. Implica la pérdida de energía inicial. Por consiguiente, es una activi-
dad entrópica e irreversible. Que sea irreversible significa que a medida 
de que progresa va siendo menos potente y va teniendo ante sí menos fu-
turo». 
127. Categories 6,5 a 7. 
128. ARENDT, H., The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1958, p. 141 . 
129. CHRISTENSON, op. cit., p. 4 0 . Cf. LLANO, A., La nueva sensibilidad, ed. 
cit., p. 4 3 (commenting on the so-called social segmentation according to 
system thinking, the author asserts): «...ese enfoque sólo alcanza a forma-
lizar los procesos previstos». 
130. Cf. CHRISTENSON, op. cit., p. 4 1 : «To which environment are we trying to 
"fit"...? To the subjectively-perceived, finite environment of the present? 
Or to the objective, infinitely-complex environment with which the sys-
tem must successfully interact in the future? If it is the second environ-
ment —would anyone deny that it is?— then the manager or designer can 
not... "fit" the organization to its environment, because he does not know 
what the relevant information will be». Cf. SPAEMANN, «Teleología natu-
ral y acción», ed. cit., p. 2 7 8 : «Dondequiera que se habla de teleología en 
la Biología moderna y se simulan estructuras teleológicas por medio de 
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modelos cibernéticos, el telos es entendido sólo como lelos para el corres-
pondiente sistema». 
131. It is in this regard that Spaemann affirms that the so-called «epistemolo-
gical monisms» (for example, Systems Theory and Theory of Evolution) 
as reduccionist despite its claim to be holistic in perspective. Cf. SPAE-
MANN, R., Lo natural y lo racional. Ensayos de Antropología, Rialp, Ma-
drid 1989, p. 2 9 : «...son, a pesar de sus intenciones, reduccionistas, pues 
refieren de modo funcional las experiencias absolutas de tipo estético, 
cognoscitivo, moral y religioso —aunque sea a través de instancias me-
diadoras— a la supervivencia de sistemas orgánicos o de otros sistemas, y 
no consiguen autointerpretar tales experiencias». 
132. Cf. CHRISTENSON, op. cit., p. 3 1 : «...to preserve this inner stability, it must 
be, as I have said, exceptionally resistant to change. But to increase this 
inner stability, it must be open to change to a higher level of complexity.» 
133. Nicomachean Ethics VI, 4 : 1140 a 1. 
134. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics VI, 4 : 1140 a 2-5 . 
135. Nicomachean Ethics II, 1: 1103 a 31 -1103 b 1. 
136. Metaphysics IX, 5 : 1059 a 37 . Cf. ALVIRA, op. cit., p. 97 . 
137. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics I, 6: 1096 a 11-1096 b 25 . 
138. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics I, 7: 1097 a 20. 
139. Nicomachean Ethics X, 7: 1177 a 19-23. 
140. Cf. Metaphysics XII, 9: 1074 b 15-1075 a 10. 
141. Nicomachean Ethics VII, 14: 1154 b 20 -25 . 
142. Cf. ZUBIRJ, X., Sobre el hombre, Alianza, Madrid 1986, p. 4 0 : «El hom-
bre como viviente que se enfrenta con las cosas reales, se enfrente con 
ellas "animalmente", y, reciprocamente, se enfrenta con las cosas-estímu-
lo "realmente". Todo comportamiento humano se inscribe en una sola ha-
bitud, en un solo enfrentamiento propio. Es lo que expresamos diciendo 
que el hombre es animal de realidades. En su virtud el animal humano 
está instalado no sólo "entre" realidades, sino "en" la realidad, en lo 
transcendental». 
143. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics X, 7: 1177 b 2 8 - 3 1 : «But such a life would be 
too high for man, for it is not in so far as something divine is present in 
him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its acti-
vity superior to that which is the exercise of other kind of excellence. If 
intellect is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is 
divine in comparison with human life». 
144. Cf. POLO, L., «Tener y dar. Reflexiones en torno a la segunda parte de la 
encíclica «Laborem Exercens»», in FERNÁNDEZ RODRÍGUEZ, F . (ed.), Es-
tudios sobre la encíclica Laborem Exercens, Biblioteca de Autores Cris-
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tianos, Madrid 1987, p. 2 0 4 : «En la medida en que un nivel es más per-
fecto que otro, existe una relación de subordinación tal que el inferior tie-
ne carácter de medio respecto del superior, y el superior es fin respecto 
del inferior». 
145. Nicomachean Ethics I, 5: 1096 a 5. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics X, 7: 1177 a 
3 0 - 3 4 : «For while a wise man, as well as a just man and the rest, needs 
the necessaries of life, when they are sufficiently equipped with things of 
that sort the just man needs people towards whom and with whom he 
shall act justly, and the temperate man, the brave man, and each of the ot-
hers is in the same case, but the wise man, even when by himself, can 
contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is». 
146. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics X, 7: 1177 b 3 1 - 1 1 7 8 a 1. 
147. Nicomachean Ethics VI, 5: 1140 b 6-7. 
148. Cf. YARZA, I., «Sobre la praxis aristotélica», in Anuario Filosófico, Vol. 
XIX, No. 1 (1986) , p. 148: «Ahora bien, las praxis éticas no manifiestan 
sólo caracteres de inmanencia, sino que ofrecen también aspectos que in-
dican una cierta procesualidad y que hacen imposible su absoluta identifi-
cación con las praxis perfectas.». This will be examined further in the dis-
cusión about the «typological structure» of the action model. 
149. Nicomachean Ethics II, 1: 1103 a 27-30 . 
150. Cf. Metaphysics VII, 7: 1 0 3 2 b 16-18: «...that which proceeds from the 
starting-point and the form is thinking, and that which proceeds from the 
final step of the thinking is making. And each of the intermediate steps is 
taken in the same way». 
151. Cf. SISÓN, A., La virtud: síntesis de tiempo y eternidad. La ética en la es-
cuela de Atenas, EUNSA, Pamplona 1992, p. 2 1 3 . 
152. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics X, 9: 1 1 8 0 a 14 -15 : «...the man who is to be 
good must be well trained and habituated, and go on to spend his time in 
worthy occupations and neither willingly and unwillingly do bad ac-
tions». Cf. POLO, «Tener y dar. Reflexiones en torno a la segunda parte de 
la encíclica «Laborem Exercens»», ed. cit., pp. 21.5-216. More precisely 
such modification is an optimization of the potentialities. More will be 
said regarding this in the following section. At this point of the discus-
sion, the interest is to point out that the action model goes beyond the 
concept of feedback process espoused by system thinking in organiza-
tions. 
153. Nicomachean Ethics II, 5: 1106 a 25-29 . 
154. Nicomachean Ethics VII, 10: 1152 a 30. 
155. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics II, 1: 1103 a 14-1103 b 2 5 . Cf. Nicomachean Et-
hics II, 5: 1105 a 2 0 - 1 1 0 6 a 13: where the Stagyrite distinguishes virtues 
as states from passions and faculties. Cf. ARENDT, op. cit., pp. 2 0 6 - 2 0 7 : 
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«Aristotle, in his political philosophy, is still well aware of what is at sta-
ke in politics, namely, no less than the ergon tou anthropou (the "work of 
man" qua man), and if he defined this "work" as "to live well" (eu zen), 
he clearly meant that «work» here is no work product but exists only in 
sheer actuality....the "work of man" is no end because the means to achie-
ve it —the virtues, or aretai— are not qualities which may or may not be 
actualized, but are themselves "actualities"». 
156. Nicomachean Ethics II, 6: 1106 a 15-17, 21-23. 
157. Metaphysics V, 20: 1022 b 4-5. 
158. Nicomachean Ethics II, 4: 1105 a 26-30. 
159. Cf. Metaphysics V, 20: 1022 b 6-10: «When one thing makes and one is 
made, between them there is a making; so too between him who has a 
garment and the garment which he has there is a having. This sort of ha-
ving, then, evidently, we cannot have; for the process will go on to inifi-
nity, if we can have the having of what we have». Cf. Metaphysics V, 23: 
1023 a 16ff. 
160. Nicomachean Ethics III, 5: 1114a 6-8. Cf. WOJTYLA, K., Persona y ac-
ción, B A C , Madrid 1982, p. 115: «Por "devenir" —el fieri latino— en-
tendemos el aspecto del dinamismo humano tanto en el aspecto del actuar 
del hombre como de lo que ocurre en él —que se centra en el hombre 
mismo, sujeto de este dinamismo en la medida en que introduce o com-
porta un proceso de cambio. De hecho, en las dinamizaciones, el sujeto 
no permanece indiferente; no sólo participa en ellas..., sino que él mismo 
se ve, de una manera u otra manera, formado o transformado por ellas...». 
161. Cf. BASTONS, M., El saber práctico según Aristóteles, ed. cit., p. 107: «En 
efecto, la "permanencia" en la facultad de sus actos impide que el tiempo 
sea mera fluencia o sucesión. Que el acto permanezca en la facultad ha-
ciéndolo más potente exige una modalidad de tiempo en el que el pasado 
permanece en el presente posibilitando el futuro». 
162. Cf. LLANO, A., La nueva sensibilidad, ed. cit., pp. 130-132. 
163. BASTONS, El saber práctico según Aristóteles, ed. cit., p. 108: «Así, mien-
tras que para las cosas el tiempo es, efectivamente, pura sucesión, para el 
ser racional, como el hombre, el tiempo se hace ingrediente de su misma 
constitución. Eso sucede bajo la forma de hábito». 
164. Nicomachean Ethics I, 6: 1096 a 24-26. 
165. Nicomachean Ethics X, 6: 1176 b 6-8. 
166. YARZA, I., op. cit., p. 149: «Siempre que se da una praxis perfecta, nece-
sariamente se da la posesión del fin; al contrario, cuando se realiza una 
praxis moral se tiende hacia un fin todavía no poseído y cuando se posee, 
acaba en cierto modo la acción. Por eso, la predicación simultánea de pre-
sente y perfecto no pueden aplicarse a las praxis éticas, al menos en el 
NOTES 8 3 
mismo sentido. Veo y he visto, pero no soy valiente y he sido valiente; tal 
simultaneidad podría ser mantenida sólo por vía habitual, es decir, porque 
poseo la virtud del valor soy valiente, y lo soy precisamente porque lo he 
sido, porque he realizado acciones valerosas». 
167. Nicomachean Ethics X, 8: 1175 b 1-5. 
168. Cf. CHRISTENSON, op. cit., p. 31. 
169. Aristotle divides tendency into three, to wit: appetite, impulse and will. 
Cf. On the Soul, III, 10: 433 a 10-433 b 10. Tendency shall heretofore be 
designated as that faculty which embraces these types. 
170. On the Soul, III, 10: 433 a 15. 
171. Cf. POLO, L., Etica: Hacia una versión moderna de los temas clásicos, ed. 
cit., p. 170: «la voluntad ut natura es una pura potencia del espíritu huma-
no, incapaz, de suyo, de acto alguno». Cf. AQUINAS, ST. THOMAS, Summa 
Theologiae, I-II, q. 105, a. 4, c: «Virtus autem passiva voluntatis se exten-
dit ad bonum in universali, est enim eius obiectum bonum universali». 
172. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1, 4: 1095 a 16-25: Where Aristotle affirms that 
there exists a general verbal agreement on the ultimate good (that is, 
«happiness») but there seems to be no agreement on what it consists in. 
Cf. POLO, Etica: Hacia una versión moderna de los temas clásicos, ed. 
cit., p. 170: «Desde el inicio nuestro espíritu es respectivo a la felicidad 
antes de saberlo. Esta no es una tesis gnoseológica, sino una tesis ontoló-
gica: la voluntad no sabe qué es la felicidad». Cf. AQUINAS, ST. THOMAS, 
In IV Sententiarum, d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 2: «...in principio nihil cog-
noscimus de fine hominis nisi hoc genérale quod est quodam optimum». 
173. POLO, L., Etica: Hacia una versión moderna de los temas clásicos, ed. 
cit., pp. 184-185: «...tener relación con el fin, si es meramente potencial, 
o transcendental, no es estar en el fin ni poseer el fin.... Esto equivale a 
sentar la eminencia del futuro en el tiempo biográfico humano: vivimos 
abiertos a un futuro que no acaba nunca mientras vivimos, es decir, a un 
futuro que no deja de serlo: a un futuro no desfuturizable. Relacionarse 
con el fin de manera enteramente potencial comporta que el fin está total-
mente en el futuro». Cf. KENNY, A., The Anatomy of the Soul, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford 1973, pp. 52-61. 
174. Nicomachean Ethics I, 7: 1097 a 15-19. 
175. Nicomachean Ethics VI, 2: 1139 b 2. 
176. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics I, 7: 1097 b 30, 35: «That which is in itself 
worthy of pursuit is...always desirable in itself and never for the sake of 
something else». Cf. Nicomachean Ethics I, 6: 1097 a 15-18. 
177. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics III, 5: 1114b 5-12: «...the aiming at the end is 
not self-chosen but one must be born with an eye, as it were, by which to 
judge rightly and choose what is truly good, and he is well endowed by 
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nature who is well endowed with this. For it is what is greatest and most 
noble, and what we cannot get or learn from another, but must have just 
such as it was when given us at birth, and to be well and nobly endowed 
with this will be complete and true natural endowment». Cf. MARIN. H., 
La antropologia aristotèlica corno filosofia de la cultura, EUNSA, Pam­
plona 1993, pp. 82­84. 
178. On the Soul III. 10:433 b 13­14. 
179. On the Soul III, 10: 433 b 16­18. Cf. CHOZA, op. ctL, pp. 164­168. 182­
198. 
180. Cf. KENNY, A., Aristotle's Theory of the Will, Duckworth. London 1979, 
p. 93. 
181. Cf. AQUINAS. St. THOMAS, 5««««» Theoiagiae, l­II, q.51. a. 2. no. 3: 
«..in agente quandoque est solum activum primcipiuira sui actus: sicul in 
igne est solum princìpium activum calefacìendì. El in tali agente non po­
test aliquàs habitus causati es proprio acni: et inde est quod res naturales 
non possunt alìquid eonsweseere vel disuescere utdiciiur in ""Ethic". In­
venìtur autenu alìquod agens in quo est principìuin activum et passivimi 
sui actus; stcut patet in actìbus faumanìs. Naomi actus appetitivae vìnutus 
procedural a vi appetitiva secundum quod movetur a vi apptehensiva re­
praesantante obiectum.». Cf. On the Sosti EU, 7:431 a 8­15: «T© perceive 
is like bare asserting or thinking; but when the object is pleasant or pain­
ful, the soul makes a sort: of affinrnation ir negation, and pursues or avoids 
the object. To feel pleasure or pain is to act with the sensitive mean to­
wards what is good or bad as such. Both avoidance and appetite when ac­
tual are identical with this...». 
182. Cf. On the SOME EH, 10:434 a 13. 
183. Om the W HI, 10:433 a 21» 23­25. 
184. POLO, L „ Étkm: Macia mm vwmém mméemei de fa* lemcra cfóswas» ed. A... 
p. 192; «EU hoinbre que solo osa la peKspcién sensibile se snelle coeibinniiar 
con bìenes iimnBeJIiatos. Asi se éesnrganiaa el tiamp» bmmano. La ètica des­
iste el punto de vista temporal es b otganìzación de la biografia ternana, es 
«tecir, lo que pannate el tnonnilMre vtvir em el tiempo stia ceder a las di'suniit­
nukbtfcs de Ila mwb Baro si la volaaaaa se onaeve sMaaaeatt pan Ila cap­
tation «te tes bienes imediaios, tas progecaos a laudai pbn» se cawaefaw». 
Cf, BROAWE, S... fifties « i l iAimswrfe, Qrfomdl Umwetsiity Ftess, Oxfeccll 
1993, pp.. 106­1107: Temteocy is «irypfcaly aroused, tey i te presence «r imna­
gùsed presence off «tee appropriate object m ©©castoni.... l i te «tesane no» take 
or otherwise engage is espresseli straightaway imi typical nmatsemmeinits iiium­
medìaleJly linked K» pmxpixm off I t e ofepat «ar i te triggerimig «ditaiimstanime.. 
Hence it is cta^teristee of tese «tesiies to tsmd to I t e t i r mmm satasff^teMii 
without mediation by njQsctiNe itoaaght».. Of'.. CMMKLras, W..„ Weaàmm off 
MW, BtaEk&rt, OxSattl 19№: TeutailDM processes imsrewBiptmM by ne­
ftexive ttomgtot m <teaets«aiEdl as «wesfaiess etf I t e «ili».. 
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185. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics VI, 2: 1139 a 35-b 2, 4: «Intellect itself, howe-
ver, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is 
practical; for this rules the productive intellect as well, since every one 
who makes makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in the 
unqualified sense (but only relative to something, i.e. of something)....and 
desire aims at this». 
186. Cf. OntheSoulUl, 10:433 a 15. 
187. Cf. INCIARTE, F., «Ética y política en la Filosofía práctica», in El reto del 
positivismo lógico, Rialp, Madrid 1974, p. 204: «lo decisivo es que la teo-
ría por sí misma es incompetente para la práctica; lo decisivo es que la te-
oría, por sí sola no sabe lo que es el bien práctico, el "agathon prakton", 
lo que hay que hacer, lo agible». 
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